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ABSTRACT
Embedding the efficient bargaining model into the R. Hall (1988) approach for estimating price-cost
margins shows that both imperfections in the product and labor markets generate a wedge between
factor elasticities in the production function and their corresponding shares in revenue. This article
investigates these two sources of discrepancies both at the industry level and the firm level using an
unbalanced panel of 10646 French firms in 38 manufacturing industries over the period 1978-2001.
By estimating standard production functions and comparing the estimated factor elasticities for labor
and materials and their shares in revenue, we are able to derive estimates of average price-cost mark-up
and extent of rent sharing parameters. For manufacturing as a whole, our estimates of these parameters
are of an order of magnitude of 1.17 and 0.44 respectively. Our industry-level results indicate that
industry differences in these parameters and in the underlying estimated factor elasticities and shares
are quite sizeable. Since firm production function, behavior and market environment are very likely
to vary even within industries, we also investigate firm-level heterogeneity in estimated mark-up and
rent-sharing parameters. To determine the degree of true heterogeneity in these parameters, we adopt
the P.A. Swamy (1970) methodology allowing to correct the observed variance in the firm-level estimates
from their sampling variance. The median of the firm estimates of the price-cost mark-up ignoring
labor market imperfections is of 1.10, while as expected it is higher of 1.20 when taking them into
account and the median of the corresponding firm estimates of the extent of rent sharing is of 0.62.
The Swamy corresponding robust estimates of true dispersion are of about 0.18, 0.37 and 0.35, showing
indeed very sizeable within-industry firm heterogeneity. We find that firm size, capital intensity, distance
to the industry technology frontier and investing in R&D seem to account for a significant part of this
heterogeneity.
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1 Introduction
In a world of perfect competition, the output contribution of individual pro-
duction factors equals their respective revenue shares. In numerous markets,
however, market imperfections and distortions are prevalent. The most com-
mon sources for market power in product as well as labor markets are product
diﬀerentiation, barriers to entry and imperfect information. Focusing on the
labor side, market power generally originates from coalitions between employers
and employees. The labor economics literature is dominated by the standard
rent sharing models where, for example, costs of hiring, firing and training can
be exploited by employees to gain market power. Those models generate wage
diﬀerentials that are unrelated to productivity diﬀerentials and hinder the com-
petitive market mechanism.1
Since the 1970s, models of imperfect competition have separately permeated
many fields of economics ranging from industrial organization (see Bresna-
han, 1989; Schmalensee, 1989 for surveys) to international trade (Brander and
Spencer, 1985; Krugman, 1979) to labor economics (see Booth, 1995; Man-
ning, 2003 for surveys). Recently, there has been a number of attempts to
examine simultaneously imperfections in both the product and the labor mar-
ket (Bughin, 1996; Cre´pon-Desplatz-Mairesse, 1999, 2002; Dobbelaere, 2004;
Neven-Ro¨ller-Zhang, 2006).2 These articles aim at bridging the gap between
1Recently, the monopsony model (Manning, 2003) has received attention in the labor
economics literature. Contrary to the classical rent sharing models, search frictions generate
upward sloping labor supply curves to individual firms, giving employers some market power.
2For theoretical contributions on this issue, we refer to Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) and
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the econometric literature on estimating product market imperfections and the
one on estimating labor market imperfections. Two methods dominate the
most recent approaches to simultaneously estimate product market and labor
market imperfections. One is the production function approach which entails
estimating a structural model including the full set of explicitly specified factor
share equations and the production function (see Bughin, 1996 and Neven et
al., 2006). The other approach is an extension of a microeconomic version of R.
Hall’s (1988) framework and boils down to estimating a reduced form equation
(see Cre´pon et al., 1999, 2002 and Dobbelaere, 2004). Following Marschak and
Andrews’ 1944 Econometrica article, many studies have applied the simulta-
neous equations methodology to production function estimation (see Griliches
and Mairesse, 1998 and Ackerberg-Benkard-Berry-Pakes, 2006 for surveys). The
core of this paper is to provide an in-depth analysis of imperfections in the prod-
uct and the labor markets as two sources of discrepancies between the marginal
products of input factors and the apparent factor prices. By doing so, we con-
tribute to the econometric productivity literature on estimating microeconomic
production functions and to the recent econometric literature on simultaneously
estimating imperfections in product and factor markets.
This article diﬀers from the existing literature in the following ways. Consis-
tent with the standard models of imperfect competition in the labor market
pointed out above, we reflect on an extension of a microeconomic version of R.
Hall’s (1988) framework. Following Cre´pon et al. (1999, 2002), we presume
Nickell (1999).
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that employees possess a degree of market power when negotiating with the
firm over wages and employment (eﬃcient bargaining model, McDonald and
Solow, 1981). Under this presumption, it can be shown that product and labor
market imperfections generate a wedge between factor elasticities in the produc-
tion function and their corresponding shares in revenue. By estimating stan-
dard production functions and comparing the estimated factor elasticities for
labor and materials and their shares in revenue, we are able to derive estimates
of average price-cost mark-up and extent of rent sharing parameters. Taking
advantage of a rich panel of French manufacturing firms covering the period
1978-2001 (INSEE, SESSI, DEP), we analyze across- as well as within-industry
heterogeneity in the estimated output elasticities and the retrieved parameters
of interest. Our industry-level results indicate that industry diﬀerences in the
estimated price-cost mark-up and extent of rent sharing parameters and in the
underlying estimated factor elasticities and shares are quite sizeable, as could
be expected. The estimated price-cost mark-up is lower than 1.04 for the first
quartile of industries and exceeds 1.19 for the top quartile. There is no evidence
of rent sharing for the first quartile of industries but we estimate it to be higher
than 0.33 for the top quartile. The estimated across-industry heterogeneity in
these parameters is partly explained by diﬀerences in profitability, technology
intensity, unionization and import penetration. Since firm production function,
behavior and market environment are very likely to vary even within industries,
we also investigate within-industry firm heterogeneity in estimated mark-up and
rent-sharing parameters (and the estimated factor elasticities and their shares).
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To determine the degree of true heterogeneity in the production function coeﬃ-
cients and parameters of interest, we adopt the P.A. Swamy (1970) methodology
as a variance decomposition approach (see Mairesse-Griliches, 1990 for a related
analysis). The median of the firm estimates of the price-cost mark-up ignoring
labor market imperfections is of 1.10, while as expected it is higher of 1.20 when
taking them into account and the median of the corresponding firm estimates
of the extent of rent sharing is of 0.62. The Swamy corresponding robust esti-
mates of true dispersion are of about 0.18, 0.37 and 0.35, showing evidence of
indeed very sizeable within-industry firm heterogeneity. Firm size, capital in-
tensity, distance to the industry technology frontier and investing in R&D seem
to account for a significant part of this heterogeneity.
We proceed as follows. Section 2 briefly presents our theoretical framework. In
Section 3, we discuss the data and provide estimates of output elasticities, price-
cost mark-ups and the extent of rent sharing at the manufacturing level. Section
4 focuses on across-industry heterogeneity and investigates diﬀerent dimensions
across industries. In Section 5 , we provide diﬀerent estimators and indicators of
heterogeneity in the firm price-cost mark-up and the extent of rent sharing and
look at within-industry heterogeneity. In addition, we concentrate on the role
of specific firm-level variables in explaining part of the estimated heterogeneity.
Section 6 concludes.
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2 Theoretical framework
Consistent with two models of imperfect competition in the labor market that
are currently commonplace in the literature, the eﬃcient bargaining model and
the monopsony model, we originally reflect on two extensions of Hall’s (1988)
framework. First, following Cre´pon et al. (1999, 2002), we presume that, for
example, costs of firing, hiring and training can be exploited by employees to
gain market power when negotiating with the firm over wages and employment
(eﬃcient bargaining). In this framework, the firm price-cost mark-up and the
extent of rent sharing generate a wedge between output elasticities and factor
shares. Second, we abstain from the assumption that the labor supply curve
facing an individual employer is perfectly elastic (monopsony model). In this
setting, the firm price-cost mark-up and the firm wage elasticity of the labor
supply curve elicit deviations between marginal products of input factors and
input prices.
Both extensions entail estimating a reduced-form equation which allows us
to identify the structural parameters -measures of product and labor market
imperfections- derived from theory. Having a priori a prediction about the
magnitude of economically meaningful parameter estimates, we can reject the
extension anchoring the monopsony model on the basis of the data. The under-
lying theoretical model and a summary of the results at the manufacturing, the
industry and the firm level are briefly presented in Appendix B. Based on the
estimates, we did not follow that route in the remaining of the paper.
This section explains the theoretical framework encompassing the eﬃcient bar-
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gaining model and derives the reduced-forms.
2.1 Eﬃcient bargaining model
Following Cre´pon et al. (1999, 2002),3 we start from a production function
Qit = ΘitF (Nit, Mit, Kit), where i is a firm index, t a time index, N is labor,
M is material input, K is capital and Θit = Aeηi+ut+υit is an index of technical
change or ”true” total factor productivity. The logarithmic specification of the
production function gives:
qit = ε
Q
Nitnit + ε
Q
Mitmit + ε
Q
Kitkit + θit (1)
We first assume that firms operate under imperfect competition in the product
market and act as price takers in the input markets. Assuming that labor and
material input are variable factors, short run profit maximization implies the
following two first-order conditions:
εQNit = µitαNit (2)
εQMit = µitαMit (3)
where αJit =
PJitJit
PitQit (J = N, M) is the share of inputs in total revenue. µit =
Pit
CQ,it refers to the mark-up of price over marginal cost. Assuming that the
elasticity of scale, λit = ε
Q
Nit + ε
Q
Mit + ε
Q
Kit , is known, the capital elasticity can
be expressed as:
εQKit = λit − µitαNit − µitαMit (4)
3For technical details, see Cre´pon et al. (1999, 2002).
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Inserting (2), (3) and (4) in (1) and rearranging terms gives the following ex-
pression:
qit − kit = µit [αNit(nit − kit) + αMit(mit − kit)] + (λit − 1) kit + θit (5)
Let us now abstain from the assumption that labor is priced competitively.
We assume that the union and the firm are involved in an eﬃcient bargaining
procedure, with both wages (w) and labor (N) being the subject of agreement.
The union objective is to maximize U(wit, Nit) = Nitwit+(N it−Nit)wit, where
N it is union membership (0 < Nit ≤ N it) and wit ≤ wit is the alternative or the
reservation wage. The firm objective is to maximize its short-run profit function:
π(wit, Nit, Mit) = Rit − witNit − jitMit. The outcome of the bargaining is the
asymmetric generalized Nash solution to:
max
wit, Nit,Mit
©
Nitwit +
¡
N it −Nit
¢
wit −N itwit
ªφit {Rit − witNit − jitMit}1−φit
(6)
where φit ∈ [0, 1] represents the bargaining power of the union.
The first-order condition with respect to material input is RM,it = jit, which
directly leads to the corresponding equation (3). Maximization with respect to
the wage rate and labor respectively gives the following first-order conditions:
wit = wit +
φit
1− φit
·
Rit − witNit − jitMit
Nit
¸
(7)
wit = RN,it +
φit
1− φit
·
Rit − witNit − jitMit
Nit
¸
(8)
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Solving simultaneously (7) and (8), leads to the following expression for the
contract curve:
RN,it = wit (9)
which shows that the firm decision about employment is the same as if it was
maximizing its short-run profit at the alternative wage.
Given that µit =
Pit
RQ,it , and that RN,it = RQ,itQN,it = RQ,it ε
Q
Nit
Qit
Nit , we also
obtain the modified equation (2):
εQNit = µit
µ
witNit
PitQit
¶
= µitαNit (10)
Given that we can rewrite (7) as αNit = αNit+
φit
1−φit
(1− αNit − αMit), equation
(10) can also be rewritten as:
εQNit = µitαNit + µit
φit
1− φit
(αNit + αMit − 1) (11)
Estimating the following equation:
qit − kit = εQNit(nit − kit) + ε
Q
Mit(mit − kit) + (λit − 1)kit + θit (12)
allows the identification of (1) the mark-up of price over marginal cost and (2)
the extent of rent sharing:
µit =
εQMit
αMit
(13)
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γit =
φit
1− φit
=
εQNit −
³
εQMit
αNit
αMit
´
εQMit
αMit
(αNit + αMit − 1)
(14)
φit =
γit
1 + γit
(15)
By embedding the eﬃcient bargaining model into a microeconomic version of
Hall’s (1988) framework, it follows that the firm price-cost mark-up and the
extent of rent sharing generate a wedge between output elasticities and factor
shares.4 The advantages of this extended approach are twofold: it avoids the
problematic computation of the user cost of capital to assess the magnitude of
the price-cost mark-up and it avoids the measurement of the alternative wage
to estimate the extent of rent sharing.
3 Data description and a first look at general
results
In this section, we discuss the data and present the results of estimating the
production function -both with and without imposing constant returns to scale-
at the manufacturing level over the complete period under consideration. We
concentrate on a range of estimators (levels OLS, first-diﬀerenced OLS, first-
diﬀerenced GMM and system GMM). By comparing the estimated average pro-
4Note that to accommodate two imperfectly competitive markets, we need at least two
variable input factors to identify the model. Going beyond Hall (1988) is hence not possible
when starting from a value added specification.
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duction function coeﬃcients, i.e. the estimated average factor elasticities of
labor and materials, with the average shares of labor and materials in revenue,5
we derive average price-cost mark-up and average extent of rent sharing param-
eters at the manufacturing level. When interpreting our market imperfection
parameters, we should however be mindful of other forces -that are not included
in our modelling framework- impacting the estimated elasticity-revenue share
ratios. Possibilities range from economic factors like distortions in the interme-
diate materials market, variable factor utilization and factor adjustment costs
to measurement issues.
3.1 Data description
We use an unbalanced panel of French manufacturing firms over the period 1978-
2001, based mainly on firm accounting information from EAE (”Enqueˆte An-
nuelle d’ Entreprise”, ”Service des Etudes et Statistiques Industrielles” (SESSI)).
We only keep firms for which we have at least 12 years of observations, ending
up with an unbalanced panel of 10646 firms with the number of observations for
each firm varying between 12 and 24.6 We use real current production deflated
5Variation in input shares is idiosyncratic and possibly related to variation in hours of
work, machinery, capacity utilization (variation in the business cycle). When deriving our key
parameters, measures of product and labor market imperfections, we want to abstract from
this possible source of contamination. Consistent with the constancy of ?µ (only) and ?φ, we
assume constant input shares.
6Putting the number of firms between brackets and the number of observations between
square brackets, the structure of the data is given by: (1398) [12], (1369) [13], (1403) [14],
(1315) [15], (3414) [16], (226) [17], (215) [18], (200) [19], (164) [20], (153) [21], (180) [22], (136)
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by the two-digit producer price index of the French industrial classification as
a proxy for output (Q). Labor (N) refers to the average number of employ-
ees in each firm for each year and material input (M) refers to intermediate
consumption deflated by the two-digit intermediate consumption price index.
The capital stock (K) is measured by the gross bookvalue of fixed assets.7 The
shares of labor (αN ) and material input (αM ) are constructed by dividing re-
spectively the firm total labor cost and undeflated intermediate consumption by
the firm undeflated production and by taking the average of these ratios over
adjacent years. Table 1 reports the means, standard deviations and first and
third quartiles of our main variables. The average growth rate of real firm out-
put for the overall sample is 2.1% per year over the period 1978-2001. Capital
has decreased at an average annual growth rate of 0.1%, while materials and
labor have increased at an average annual growth rate of 4% and 0.6% respec-
tively. As expected for firm-level data, the dispersion of all these variables is
considerably large. For example, capital growth is smaller than -7.2% for the
[23], (473) [24]. The average number of observations per firm is 15.5 and the total number of
observations is 165009.
7The capital stock measure used in this paper is the gross-book value of tangible assets
as reported in the firm balance sheets at the beginning of the year (or end of the previous
year), adjusted for inflation . This is a standard measure in microeconometric studies of the
production function mainly based on firm accounting information. It has the advantage of
relying on direct information provided by the firm, and does not make the strong assumptions
underlying the capital stock measures obtained by so called “perpetual inventory method”,
mainly of a constant rate of depreciation or a fixed service life. In practice , however , panel
data estimates of capital elasticities appear to be very robust to the use of the two types of
measures. See for example Atkinson and Mairesse (1978) and Mairesse and Pescheux (1980).
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first quartile of firms and higher than 6% for the fourth quartile.
<Insert Table 1 about here>
3.2 Manufacturing-level results
Being interested in average output elasticities and derived average reduced-form
parameters, we estimate the following specification for manufacturing as a whole
over the period 1978-2001:
qit − kit = εQN (nit − kit) + ε
Q
M (mit − kit) + (λ− 1) kit + ζit (16)
with and without imposing constant returns to scale.
Part 1 of Table 2 shows the results of estimating the basic production function
(Eq.(16)) under the assumption of constant returns to scale (λ = 1), while Part
2 allows for non constant returns to scale. We present both set of results for
a range of estimators. Columns 1 and 2 report the levels OLS and the first-
diﬀerenced OLS estimates, respectively. From column 3 onwards, we take into
account endogeneity problems. Columns 3 and 5 show the results of estimating
the model in first diﬀerences to eliminate unobserved firm-specific eﬀects and
using appropriate lags of the variables in levels (n, m and k) as instruments
for the diﬀerenced regressors to correct for simultaneity (standard panel first-
diﬀerenced GMM). As argued by, for example, Blundell and Bond (2000), the
first-diﬀerenced GMM estimator might be subject to large finite sample biases
due to the time series persistence properties of some of the variables. In columns
4 and 6, we therefore adopt a more eﬃcient GMM estimator which includes level
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moments (system GMM).8 The last two columns report the results of estimating
a dynamic specification of Eq.(16), allowing for an autoregressive component in
the productivity shocks.9
The first section of each part of the table gives the estimated output elasticities.
The second section presents our parameters of interest which are derived from
the average production function coeﬃcient estimates: an estimate of the average
price-cost mark-up assuming perfect competition in the labor market (bµ only),
and estimates of the average price-cost mark-up (bµ) and the corresponding av-
erage extent of rent sharing (bφ).10 We also report the profit ratio parameter,
which can be expressed as the estimated mark-up divided by the estimated scale
elasticity ( ?µ?λ ). This ratio shows that the source of profit lies either in imperfect
competition or decreasing returns to scale.
Focusing on our preferred estimator, the first-diﬀerenced OLS estimator,11 εQN ,
εQM and ε
Q
K are estimated at 0.298, 0.587 and 0.115 respectively, under the
8The GMM estimation is carried out in Stata 9.2 (Roodman, 2005). We report results for
the one-step estimator, for which inference based on the asymptotic variance matrix is shown
to be more reliable than for the asymptotically more eﬃcient two-step estimator (Arellano
and Bond, 1991).
9The productivity term is modelled as: ζit = ηi +ut + υit, with υit = ρυit−1+ eit where
|ρ| < 1, and eit ∼MA(0). ηi is an unobserved firm-specific eﬀect, ut a year-specific intercept
and υit is an AR(1) error term.
10The standard errors (σ) of ?µ and ?φ are computed using the Delta Method (Wool-
ridge, 2002): σ2?µ =
1
α2M
σ2
?εQM
, σ2?γ =
?
αM
αN+αM−1
?2
?
?εQM
?2
σ2
?εQN
−2?εQN ?ε
Q
M σ?εQN,?ε
Q
M
+
?
?εQN
?2
σ2
?εQM?
?εQM
?4
and σ2?φ =
σ2?γ
(1+?γ)4 .
11We prefer the first-diﬀerenced OLS estimator as this estimator allows us to compare
consistently our results at the manufacturing, the industry and the firm level.
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assumption of constant returns to scale. The derived price-cost mark-up is found
to be 1.17 and the corresponding extent of rent sharing 0.44. Consistent with
previous findings (e.g. Dobbelaere, 2004 for Belgian manufacturing as a whole),
estimating price-cost mark-ups relying on the Hall (1988) approach, assuming
allocative wages, generates a downward bias. For France, ignoring imperfect
competition in the labor market brings the price-cost mark-up estimate down
to 1.11. Intuitively, this underestimation corresponds to the omission of the part
of product rents captured by the workers. Note that for all the GMM results,
none of the specification tests is passed.12 Since, contrary to this finding, the
specification tests are passed nearly everywhere in the estimates at the industry
level (see infra), we conclude that the rejection of the tests at the manufacturing
level is due to imposing common slopes for the industries. Apart from being
interested in across-industry heterogeneity per se, this finding motivates our
analysis at the industry level. Note that in the dynamic specification results,
the test of common factor restrictions is never passed.13
12Results not reported but available upon request. The validity of the instruments in the
first-diﬀerenced equations is rejected by the Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions but the
Diﬀerence Sargan test does not reject the validity of the additional instruments in diﬀerences
in the levels equations.
13Using ζit = ηi+ut+υit, with υit = ρυit−1+eit and eit ∼MA(0), and assuming constant
returns to scale (λ = 1), we can transform (16) through substitution to obtain qit − kit =
π1(qit−1 − kit−1) + π2(nit − kit) + π3(nit−1 − kit−1) + π4(mit − kit) + π5(mit−1 − kit−1) +
η∗i +u
∗
t+eit, where π1 = ρ, π2 = ε
Q
N , π3 = −ρ ε
Q
N , π4 = ε
Q
M , π5 = −ρ ε
Q
M , η
∗
i = (1− ρ) ηi and
u∗t = ut − ρut−1. Given consistent estimates of the unrestricted parameter vector π = (π1,
π2, π3, π4, π5), the two non-linear common factor restrictions π3 = −π1 π2 and π5 = −π1 π4
can be tested using minimum distance to get the restricted parameter vector
?
εQN , ε
Q
M , ρ
?
.
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Comparing the results allowing for non constant returns to scale (Part 2 of Table
2) with those imposing constant returns to scale (Part 1 of Table 2), leads
to the following insights. The returns to scale assumption evidently aﬀects
the estimated output elasticities of factor inputs. In general, the production
function coeﬃcients are estimated to be lower when allowing for non constant
returns to scale. However, since the first-order conditions with respect to the
variable input factors -Eq.(2) or (11) for labor and Eq.(3) for materials- do not
depend on the returns to scale assumption, our key parameters (bµ only, bµ and
bφ) are robust to this assumption.14 This crucial result along with our objective
to compare consistently estimates of product and labor market imperfections
at the manufacturing, the industry and the firm level, motivates our decision
to maintain the constant returns to scale assumption in the remaining of the
paper. Due to the finding of decreasing returns to scale, the average profit ratio
parameter is estimated to be lower when allowing for non constant returns to
scale.
<Insert Table 2 about here>
By way of sensitivity test, we restrict the total sample to those firms for which
we have 24 years of observations and estimate Eq.(16) imposing constant returns
to scale. The results are reported in Table A.1. in Appendix A. On average, the
14Except for the estimated price-cost mark-up (?µ) using the first-diﬀerenced GMM estima-
tor, which is estimated to be much lower when allowing for non constant returns to scale (see
Part 2 of Table 2). This result is due to the considerable decrease in the estimated output
elasticity of materials (?εQM ) when abstaining from the constant returns to scale assumption.
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price-cost mark-up parameters are estimated to be higher and the corresponding
extent of rent sharing parameters are estimated to be lower than those of the
total sample across the diﬀerent estimators.15
4 Across-industry heterogeneity in µˆ and bφ
This section concentrates on across-industry heterogeneity. We first present
the detailed results of estimating the production function (Eq.(16)) under the
assumption of constant returns to scale for each of our 38 industries. Hav-
ing observed considerable heterogeneity in the diﬀerence between the factors’
estimated marginal products and their measured payments, we then tie this es-
timated heterogeneity to observables (profitability, technology intensity, union-
ization and import penetration).
4.1 Across-industry estimates
Being interested in average parameters, the average industry-level price-cost
mark-up (µˆj), relative extent of rent sharing (bγj) and extent of rent sharing
(bφj) are derived from comparing the estimated average output elasticities with
the average input shares: µˆj =
?εQMj
αMj
, bγj = ?εQNj−
?
?εQMj
αNj
αMj
?
?εQMj
αMj
(αNj+αMj−1)
and bφj = ?γj1+?γj .
We decompose the total sample into 38 manufacturing industries according to
15In contrast to the total sample results, the Sargan test does not reject the joint validity of
the lagged levels of n, m and k dated (t−2) (and earlier) as instruments in the first-diﬀerenced
equations. However, the validity of the additional first-diﬀerenced variables as instruments in
the levels equations is rejected by the Diﬀerence Sargan test.
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the French industrial classification (”Nomenclature e´conomique de synthe`se -
Niveau 3” [NES 114]). Table A.2 in Appendix A shows the industry repartition
of the sample. Table 3 summarizes the first-diﬀerenced OLS and the system
GMM results of the industry analysis. For each estimator, we consider two
subsamples. The first subsample contains the estimates for which the price-cost
mark-up equals or exceeds 1 and the corresponding extent of rent sharing lies
in the [0, 1]-interval.16 The second subsample includes the estimates showing
no evidence of rent sharing and a price-cost mark-up ignoring labor market im-
perfections that equals or exceeds 1.17 Both estimators have 21 industries in
common in the first subsample and 8 in the second subsample. Detailed infor-
mation on the first-diﬀerenced OLS and the system GMM estimates is presented
in Table A.3.a in Appendix A. In the left part of Table A.3.a [Part 1-2], we com-
pute the average shares of labor, material input and capital for each industry.
The middle part reports the first-diﬀerenced OLS and the system GMM esti-
mates of the output elasticities. The right part presents the derived parameters
16This subsample contains 24 industries using the first-diﬀerenced OLS estimator. The
estimates of ?µj (≥ 1) and ?µj only (≥ 1) are significant for all industries, whereas ?φj (∈ [0, 1])
is significant for 19 out of 24 industries. As to the system GMM results, 26 industries belong
to this subsample. ?µj (≥ 1) and ?µj only (≥ 1) are significant for all industries, whereas
?φj (∈ [0, 1]) is significant for 16 out of 26 industries.
17This subsample contains 14 industries using the first-diﬀerenced OLS estimator. The
estimates of ?µj only (≥ 1) are significant for all industries, whereas ?µj (≥ 1) is significant for
9 out of 14 industries. 4 out of 14 estimated rent sharing parameters (?φj = 0) are significant.
As to the system GMM results, 11 industries belong to this subsample. ?µj only (≥ 1) and ?µj
(≥ 1) are significant for all industries, whereas there is only one significantly estimated rent
sharing parameter (?φj = 0).
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of interest: the price-cost mark-up assuming that labor is priced competitively
(bµj only), the price-cost mark-up taking into account labor market imperfec-
tions (bµj), the relative extent of rent sharing (bγj) and the extent of rent sharing
(bφj). For each estimator, we first report the estimates of the first subsample
[24 industries for OLS DIF and 26 for system GMM], followed by those of the
second subsample [14 for OLS DIF and 11 for system GMM18]. Within each
subsample, the table is drawn up in increasing order of bµj only. Economically
meaningful estimates are blackened.19
From Table 3, it follows that industry diﬀerences in the parameters and in the
underlying estimated factor elasticities and shares are quite sizable, as could be
expected. Concentrating on the economically meaningful first-diﬀerenced OLS
estimates of the price-cost mark-up and the corresponding extent of rent sharing
[24 industries], the price-cost mark-up (bµj) is estimated to be lower than 1.15
for the first quartile of industries and higher than 1.22 for the top quartile. The
corresponding estimate of the extent of rent sharing is found to be lower than
0.13 for the first quartile of industries and higher than 0.39 for the top quartile.
The median values are estimated at 1.18 and 0.27 respectively. As to the first-
diﬀerenced OLS results of the full sample, the estimated price-cost mark-up (bµj)
is lower than 1.04 for the first quartile of industries and exceeds 1.19 for the top
quartile. There is no evidence of rent sharing for the first quartile of industries
18In Table A.3.a [Part 4], we also report the estimates of industry 1, for which ?φj =
1 and ?µj only > 1. The estimate of the extent of rent sharing is however not significant.
19If ?µj ≥ 1 and ?φj ∈ [0, 1], ?µj, ?γj and ?φj are blackened (see f.e. industry 6, OLS DIF).
If ?φj = 0 and ?µj only ≥ 1, ?µj only is blackened (see f.e. industry 3, OLS DIF).
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but we estimate it to be higher than 0.33 for the top quartile. Focusing on the
median, the price-cost mark-up and the extent of rent sharing are estimated at
1.15 and 0.12 respectively. Ignoring the occurrence of rent sharing reduces the
estimated median price-cost mark-up to 1.09.
Table C.1 in Appendix C presents summary information on the accounting price-
cost mark-ups and the corresponding extent of rent sharing at the industry
level and shows the correlation between these accounting measures and the
first-diﬀerenced OLS estimates of bµj only, bµj and bφj .20 For the subsample
of 24 industries, the correlation amounts to 0.69 for the price-cost mark-up
assuming allocative wages, 0.25 for the price-cost mark-up taking into account
labor market imperfections and 0.23 for the extent of rent sharing. For the
subsample of 14 industries, the correlation is 0.35 for the price-cost mark-up
ignoring labor market imperfections.
When taking into account endogeneity problems, the estimates of the price-cost
mark-up appear to be higher than the first-diﬀerenced OLS results (see system
GMM results in Table 3). For the full sample, the median price-cost mark-up
and the median extent of rent sharing are estimated at 1.25 and 0.11 respec-
tively. For 26 out of 38 industries, we find evidence of price-cost mark-ups being
underestimated when imperfection in the labor market is ignored, hence validat-
ing the findings of Bughin (1996) and Dobbelaere (2004). Consistent with the
first-diﬀerenced OLS results, the median of the industry estimates of the price-
cost mark-up (value of 1.28) and -in particular- the median of the corresponding
20For details on the computation of the accounting measures, we refer to Appendix C.
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industry estimates of the extent of rent sharing (value of 0.29) are considerably
higher when considering only the economically meaningful parameter estimates
[26 industries].
<Insert Table 3 about here>
Table A.3.b in Appendix A summarizes all the industry estimates. The upper
part displays the correlation between our parameters of interest for a range
of estimators (first-diﬀerenced OLS, first-diﬀerenced GMM and system GMM).
The lower part of the table shows the correlation of the parameters across the
diﬀerent estimators. The left part of the table considers the full sample while the
right part restricts the sample to those industries for which the estimated extent
of rent sharing lies in the [0, 1]-interval. The correlation between the estimated
price-cost mark-up ignoring the occurrence of rent sharing (bµj only) and the
estimate taking into account labor market imperfections (bµj) amounts to 0.6
for each estimator (see upper part of Table A.3.b). The correlation between
the price-cost mark-up estimate (bµj) and the estimated relative extent of rent
sharing (bγj) is found to be 0.8 for the whole sample and 0.5 for the restricted
sample. From the lower part of Table A.3.b, it follows that particularly the
first-diﬀerenced OLS and the system GMM estimates are highly correlated.
4.2 Diﬀerent dimensions across industries
To investigate diﬀerent dimensions across industries, we classify the industries
according to profitability, technology intensity, unionization and import pene-
tration. For each dimension, we consider four types (low, medium low, medium
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high and high). Columns 4-7 in Table A.2 in Appendix A indicate the type to
which each industry belongs.
As to the profitability dimension, we calculate the average industry-level price-
cost margin (PCM)21 and determine the diﬀerent types based on the quartile
values. Following Bain (1941), many analytical and empirical studies have pro-
vided evidence of a positive relationship between market structure and perfor-
mance (profitability) (see Martin, 1993 for a survey). Therefore, we expect a
positive correlation between PCMs and price-cost mark-ups.
The identification of the technology types relies on the OECD classification.
This methodology uses two indicators of technology intensity, R&D expendi-
tures divided by value added and R&D expenditures divided by production
(OECD, 2005). When competition intensifies, firms’ reaction is not limited to
pricing behavior and, indeed, Sutton (1991, 1998) insists on the endogeneity of
market structure. An increase in the competitive environment may trigger an
endogenous reaction of firms, through an increase in R&D spending for instance.
This might force out firms that are unable to keep the pace. R&D expenditures
could hence be positively related to mark-ups. The correlation between technol-
ogy intensity and rent sharing is a priori unclear. As discussed in Betcherman
(1991), it depends on the importance of labor costs in the firm’s total costs and
on the workers’ essentiality in the production process.
To construct our measure of the degree of unionization, we merge our original
21The price-cost margin is defined as the diﬀerence between revenue and variable cost over
revenue (see Schmalensee, 1989 p. 960).
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dataset consisting of firms from EAE (SESSI) with the REPONSE 1998 (”Re-
lations Professionnelles et Ne´gociations d’ Entreprises”) database collected by
the French Ministry of Labor. Having 911 firms left, we compute the aver-
age industry-level union density.22 Similar to the profitability dimension, the
quartile values define the four types. According to the standard trade union
literature, unions are most likely to be created in firms where rents can be ex-
tracted. Since this is most likely to happen if there is imperfect competition
in the product market, we expect a positive correlation between union density
and price-cost mark-ups. Union density is expected to be positively related to
the extent of rent sharing, as shown by Karier (1985) and Conyon and Machin
(1991).
As to the openness dimension, we compute the average industry-level import
penetration ratio as the ratio of industry product imports to the sum of these
imports plus the value of domestic production in the industry using the input-
output tables defined at the three-digit level (National Institute for Statistics
and Economic Studies (INSEE)). The diﬀerent types are identified through the
quartile values. Firms under intensifying pressure from foreign competition are
induced to reduce their price-cost margins because of the increase in the per-
ceived elasticity of the demand they are facing. Following Levinsohn (1993),
many studies have shown evidence of the imports-as-market-discipline hypothe-
sis (see Boulhol et al., 2006 for references). Following Rodrik’s (1997) argument
22Since we use a small non-representative subsample (only 911 firms) to define the degree
of industry-level unionization, the resulting classification has to be interpreted with caution.
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that the closer substitutes domestic and foreign workers are, due to e.g. interna-
tional trade, the lower the enterprise surplus ending up with workers, we expect
a negative correlation between import penetration and the extent of rent sharing
(see also Brock and Dobbelaere, 2006 and Dumont et al., 2006). Abraham et al.
(2006) and Boulhol et al. (2006) provide support for the imports-as-product-
and-labor-market discipline hypothesis using Belgian and UK firm-level data.
Graphs 1-4 aim at discerning a pattern in the economically meaningful industry
estimates of bµj and bφj .23 Each graph corresponds to one of the four dimen-
sions (profitability, technology intensity, unionization and import penetration).
Within each dimension, diﬀerent symbols refer to each of the four types (low,
medium low, medium high and high). The dashed lines denote the median val-
ues (bµj,med = 1.18, bφj,med = 0.27). Given the positive correlation between bµj
and bφj of 0.48, most industries are situated either in the upper right part or
the lower left part of the graphs. Focusing on Graph 1, the price-cost mark-
up of two thirds of the highly profitable industries is higher than the median
price-cost mark-up. As to bφj , no clear pattern can be detected. From Graph
2, it follows that nearly two thirds of the low-technology industries are char-
acterized by a relatively high bµj and bφj (see upper right part of the graph).24
Concentrating on Graph 3, nearly two thirds of the industries with a high de-
gree of unionization have a price-cost mark-up exceeding the median value. All
weakly unionized industries are situated in the lower part of the graph, being
23The corresponding industries are blackened in Table A.2 in Appendix A.
24Note that in contrast to Graphs 1, 3 and 4, 12 industries belong to the low-technology
category.
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characterized by an estimated price-cost mark-up below the median value. The
estimated extent of rent sharing of half of those industries is lower than the me-
dian value.25 Graph 4 shows that industries with high import penetration rates
have estimated price-cost mark-ups below the median value, while industries
shielded from import competition display an estimated extent of rent sharing
exceeding the median value.
<Insert Graphs 1-4 about here>
5 Within-industry heterogeneity in µˆ and bφ
Production behavior is very likely to vary even within industries, because input
combinations diﬀer, labor markets are not homogeneous and demand might be
more elastic or inelastic in one firm than another. In this section, we allow for
heterogeneous production behavior across firms. Since production is primarily
aﬀected by input factors and only secondarily by -for example- demand con-
ditions, we assume that the relationships among variables are proper but the
production function coeﬃcients diﬀer across firms. Therefore, we estimate the
production function for each firm i and retrieve the firm price-cost mark-up
bµi and the extent of rent sharing bφi from the estimated firm output elasticities
(bεQJi , J = N,M,K).26
25Graphs 1-4 display the first-diﬀerenced OLS estimates of ?µj and ?φj (see blackened indus-
try estimates in Table A.3.a, Part 1). Plotting the system GMM estimates of ?µj against ?φj
(see blackened industry estimates in Table A.3.a, Part 3) leads largely to the same conclusions.
26Besides allowing for the possible heterogeneity across firms, we could also focus on the
stability of the structural parameters over time. However, relaxing the constancy of µi and
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This section starts with a brief discussion of the Swamy (1970) methodology.
We then apply this methodology to analyze whether there is real firm-level
heterogeneity in the estimated average factor elasticities and average shares,
and the derived average mark-up and rent sharing parameters. We end the
section by tying the sizeable estimated firm heterogeneity in product and labor
market imperfection parameters to observables.
5.1 Swamy (1970) methodology
To determine the degree of true heterogeneity in the coeﬃcients and parameters
of interest, we adopt the Swamy (1970) methodology as a variance decompo-
sition approach. This method allows us to estimate the variance components
of heterogeneity in the estimated firm output elasticities (bεQJi , J = N,M,K)
and the derived structural parameters (µˆi only, µˆi, bγi and φˆi), i.e., the pure
sampling variance and the true heterogeneity.
Considering random production function coeﬃcients that vary across firms, let-
ting x1it ≡ 1 and assuming constant returns to scale, we can rewrite the pro-
duction function as follows:27
qit =
KX
k=1
εkitxkit + ξit (17)
εi is assumed to be randomly distributed with εi = eε + ηi. eε = (eε1, ..., eεK)0
φi in the time dimension would strain our already overextended computational framework.
27For the sake of parsimony, we denote the explanatory variables by xkit (k = 1,..,K)
and the firm output elasticities by εkit (dropping the superscript (Q) and the subscript
(J = N,M)).
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represents the common-mean coeﬃcient vector and ηi = (η1i, ..., ηKi)
0 the in-
dividual deviation from the common mean eε. Following Swamy (1970), we
assume that the errors for firm i are uncorrelated across firms and allow for
heteroskedasticity across firms, ξi ∼ N
¡
0, σ2i I
¢
. E (ηi) = 0, E
¡
ηiη0j
¢
= ∆, if
i = j, E
¡
ηiη0j
¢
= 0, otherwise. Swamy suggests first estimating Eq. (17) for
each firm i by OLS giving:
bεi = (X 0iXi)−1X 0i qi with (18)
bξi = qi −Xibεi (19)
Using (18) and (19), we obtain unbiased estimators of σ2i and ∆, given by
Eq. (20) and (21) respectively.
bσ2i = bξ0ibξiT −K (20)
with the estimated variance-covariance matrix V ar (bεi) = bσ2i (X 0iXi)−1. Defin-
ing the mean of bεi as ε = 1N NP
i=1
bεi, their variance can be estimated as:
b∆ = 1
N − 1
NP
i=1
(bεi − ε) (bεi − ε)0 − 1N NPi=1V ar (bεi)
=
1
N − 1
NP
i=1
(bεi − ε) (bεi − ε)0| {z }
(1)
− 1
N
NP
i=1
σ2i (X
0
iXi)
−1
| {z }
(2)
(21)
The logic behind the definition of b∆, the Swamy estimate of true variance of the
coeﬃcients, is that due to noisy estimates (bεi), much of the variation in bεi is
not caused by ”real” parameter variability but purely by sampling error. Swamy
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(1970) thus suggests to correct for this sampling variability by subtracting it
oﬀ.
Two major advantages of the Swamy methodology are that these estimates are
the most straightforward to obtain among the diﬀerent estimators of coeﬃcient
heterogeneity and that they are robust to the possibility of correlated eﬀects
between the firm intercept and slope parameters and the other variables in the
equation since they are based on individual regression estimates (see Mairesse-
Griliches, 1990).28
5.2 General overview
Table 4 summarizes the first-diﬀerenced OLS results of estimating Eq.(17) for
each firm i in a comprehendible fashion. Consistent with the across-industry
estimates, we consider two subsamples of estimates. The first part of Table
4 shows the results of the first subsample keeping only the firm estimates of
28Besides the Swamy method, the random coeﬃcient model literature suggests another
approach to estimate the variance components of heterogeneity, using the maximum likelihood
(ML) estimator and the more flexible approach of regressing the squares and the cross-products
of residuals on comparable squares and cross-products of the independent variables (Hildreth
and Houck, 1968; Amemiya, 1977; MaCurdy, 1985). Contrary to the Swamy estimates, the
ML estimates and those based on the regression of the squares and cross-products of the
residuals assume either the independence of the firm slope parameteres or the independence
between both the firm intercept and slope parameters and the other variables in the equation,
i.e., the absence of correlated eﬀects (see Mairesse-Griliches, 1990 for a comparison of the
three diﬀerent approaches).
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which µˆi ≥ 1 and φˆi ∈ [0, 1] [5906 firms].29 The second part of Table 4 presents
the results of the second subsample restricting the firm estimates to those of
which φˆi = 0 and µˆi only ≥ 1 [1239 firms].30 The last part of Table 4 summa-
rizes the results of all the firm estimates [10646 firms]. Each part is split into
three sections, focusing on the simple mean, the weighted mean and the median
respectively. Table A.4 in Appendix A, which is structured in the same way
as Table 4, reports detailed information on the results of applying the Swamy
(1970) methodology. For comparison purposes, we list also similar statistics for
the firm input shares (αJi , J = N,M,K). Within each part, the last row of each
section reports the F-statistic for the hypothesis of equality of the estimates (or
the computed variables) across firms.
The first section of each part of Table A.4 gives the original Swamy estimates
of true variance [bσ2true, corresponding to b∆ in Eq. (21)], which are computed as
the diﬀerence between the observed variance of the individually estimated firm
coeﬃcients [bσ2o, corresponding to term (1) in Eq. (21)] and the mean of the cor-
responding sampling variance [bσ2s, corresponding to term (2) in Eq. (21)].31 The
29Looking at the significance of the parameter estimates, we find that 5817 out of 5906
estimates of ?µi (≥ 1), 4414 out of 5906 estimates of ?φi (∈ [0, 1]) and 4426 out of 5906
estimates of ?µi only (≥ 1) are significant.
30Within this subsample, 1238 out of 1239 estimates of ?µi only (≥ 1) are significant. As
to ?µi (≥ 1), 983 out of 1239 estimates are significant. None of the estimated rent sharing
parameters (?φi = 0). is found to be significant.
31Taking into account the unbalanced nature of the sample, the equivalent for the in-
put shares αJ can be expressed as: ?σ2true = 1N−1
N?
i=1
?
αJi − αJ
?2 − 1
T
?σ2s, where nt de-
notes the number of years within firm i and Nnt the number of firms having nt years
30
observed variance
³bσ2o´ illustrates the sizeable dispersion in the estimated firm
output elasticities and the derived parameters and shows that the heterogeneity
at the firm level is largely magnified by large sampling errors arising from the
rather short time series available. Due to the large sampling variance
³bσ2s´, we
even find zero estimates of true variance in the individually estimated extent of
rent sharing φˆi in the first subsample [5906 firms] and the total sample [10646
firms]. All the observed variability is either common to all firms, transitory or
attributable to sampling variability. Given the large number of degrees of free-
dom, all the F-statistics are significant at conventional significance levels (the
critical value barely exceeds 1 for our sample size), except for φˆi.
32 Except for
µˆi only, the large sampling variance drives the true variance in all the derived
parameters towards zero in the second subsample [1239 firms].
To investigate whether the true heterogeneity is not just an artefact of outliers
and large sampling errors, we look at the Swamy estimates of the weighted true
variance and the Swamy estimates of the robust true variance. The Swamy
estimate of the weighted true variance, which is calculated as the weighted
observed variance minus the weighted sampling variances, is reported in the
of observations. T =
24?
nt=12
?Nnt
N nt
?
, αJi =
1
T
nt?
t=1
αJit , αJ =
1
N
N?
i=1
αJi and ?σ2s =
1
N(T−1)
N?
i=1
nt?
t=1
?
αJit − αJi
?2
.
32One can question, however, the validity of these F-statistics in such large samples. A more
symmetric treatment of the inference problem, advocated by Leamer (1978), would necessitate
using a critical value which increases with the number of degrees of freedom. This would lead
to less certainty in rejecting the hypothesis of homogeneity (Mairesse-Griliches, 1990).
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second section of each part of Table A.4.33 The weight is defined as the inverse
of the sampling variance. As to the estimated firm output elasticities (bεQJi ,
J = N,M,K), the weighted observed and -even more so- the weighted sampling
variance are considerably smaller than the corresponding simple observed and
simple sampling variance. As such, the Swamy estimate of the weighted true
variance exceeds the corresponding Swamy estimate of the simple true variance
in both subsamples. As to the total sample, the Swamy estimate of the weighted
true variance is very similar to the corresponding Swamy estimate of the simple
true variance. Focusing on the derived structural parameters (µˆi only, µˆi, bγi
and φˆi), the diﬀerence between the weighted observed (sampling) variance and
the simple observed (sampling) variance is even more pronounced. As a result,
the Swamy estimates of the weighted true variance are significantly diﬀerent
from zero in the first subsample and the total sample. Hence, contrary to the
results in the first section, the hypothesis of homogeneity is clearly rejected
everywhere, even for φˆi. Given our focus on µˆi only in the second subsample,
we only find true variance in that parameter in this subsample.
In section 3 of each part of Table A.4, we report the Swamy estimates of the
robust true variance,34 which are computed by subtracting the median of the
individually estimated sampling variances from the interquartile observed vari-
ance.35 Consistent with the Swamy estimates of the weighted true variance, we
33In practice, the weighted sampling variance is calculated as N
N?
i=1
?σ2i .
34When focusing on robust indicators and estimates, we assume that the individually esti-
mated parameters are normally distributed and the sampling variance is distributed as χ2.
35The term interquartile observed variance indicates that the observed variance is computed
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find persistent individual firm diﬀerences in both the firm input shares, the firm
estimated elasticities and the derived parameters in the first subsample and the
total sample . Compared to the weighted results, both the interquartile observed
variance, the robust sampling variance and the Swamy estimate of robust true
variance of the derived parameters are larger than their weighted counterparts.
Having explained the computations of Table 4, we discuss now briefly that ta-
ble. The first row of each section lists respectively the simple averages, the
weighted averages and the median values of the firm input shares, the individ-
ually estimated firm output elasticities and the derived structural parameters.
The corresponding observed dispersion (bσo) is put between brackets while the
corresponding Swamy estimates of true dispersion (bσtrue) are given between
square brackets. As to the estimated firm output elasticities and the price-cost
mark-ups, the simple mean, the weighted mean and the median do not diﬀer
considerably. For the sample of 5906 firms, the elasticities of labor, material
input and capital are estimated at about 0.13, 0.73 and 0.11, respectively. The
estimates of the price-cost mark-up ignoring the occurrence of rent sharing and
the one taking into account labor market imperfections amount to 1.14 and
1.46 respectively.36 The simple average of the estimated extent of rent sharing
from the interquartile range of the firm input shares and firm estimates.
36At the individual level, the correlation between the derived price-cost mark-up ignoring
the occurrence of rent sharing and the estimate taking into account labor market imperfections
amounts to 0.31 for the subsample consisting of 5906 firm estimates. Except for 13 firms, the
lack of explicit consideration of labor market imperfections results in an underestimation of
the firm-level price-cost mark-up.
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³
φˆi
´
is close to the median value (0.58). The weighted mean points to a higher
extent of rent sharing (0.81). Concentrating on the median, the Swamy robust
estimates of true dispersion of 0.14 for µˆi only, 0.28 for µˆi and 0.20 for φˆi are
good indicators of a credible amount of heterogeneity. For the sample of 1239
firms, the median of the firm estimates of the elasticities of labor, material input
and capital is of 0.40, 0.59 and 0.01, respectively. The median of the estimated
price-cost mark-ups ignoring labor market imperfections is of 1.22 with a Swamy
corresponding robust estimate of true dispersion of 0.17. As to the total sample
[10646 firms], the median of the estimated elasticities of labor, material input
and capital is of 0.26, 0.61 and 0.09. The median of the firm estimates of the
price-cost mark-up assuming that labor is priced competitively is of 1.1, while
it is higher of 1.2 when taking labor market imperfections into account and the
median of the corresponding firm estimates of the extent of rent sharing is of
0.62.37 The Swamy corresponding robust estimates of true dispersion of 0.18,
0.37 and 0.35 give evidence of a very sizeable within-industry firm heterogeneity.
<Insert Table 4 about here>
Table C.2 in Appendix C presents summary information on the accounting
price-cost mark-ups and the corresponding extent of rent sharing at the firm
level and gives the correlation between these accounting measures and the first-
diﬀerenced OLS estimates of bµi only, bµi and bφi. For the subsample of 5906
37For the total sample, the correlation between µˆi only and µˆi amounts to 0.44. For 61%
of the firms, the firm price-cost mark-up is underestimated when labor market imperfections
are ignored.
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firms, the correlation amounts to 0.38 for the price-cost mark-up assuming that
labor is priced competitively, 0.32 for the price-cost mark-up taking into account
labor market imperfections and 0.01 for the extent of rent sharing. For the
subsample of 1239 firms, the correlation is found to be 0.58 for the price-cost
mark-up ignoring labor market imperfections.
5.3 Within-industry heterogeneity
Starting from the 10646 firm estimates, we group the individually estimated firm
elasticities and the derived structural parameters into 38 industries, according
to the industry classification in Section 4. Being interested in within-industry
heterogeneity, we report the weighted mean and the corresponding Swamy esti-
mate of weighted true standard deviation of the firm estimates in Table A.5 in
Appendix A. The ranking of industries equals the one of Table A.3.a [Part1-2].
Table 5 summarizes the within-industry estimates. Focusing on the subsample
of 24 industries, one-fourth of the industries exhibit a price-cost mark-up (bµij)
which is lower than 1.16. Looking at the top quartile of industries, the estimated
price-cost mark-up exceeds 1.23. The estimated extent of rent sharing (bφij) ap-
pears to be lower than 0.76 for the first quartile of industries and higher than
0.85 for the top quartile. As to the subsample of 14 industries, the estimates of
the price-cost mark-up ignoring labor market imperfections (bµij only) are less
dispersed. This estimated price-cost mark-up is found to be lower than 1.09 for
the first quartile of industries and higher than 1.11 for the top quartile. As to
the total sample, one-fourth of the industries display a price-cost mark-up (bµij)
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which is higher than 1.09. At the top quartile, the estimated price-cost mark-up
exceeds 1.22. The estimated extent of rent sharing appears to be lower than
0.76 for the first quartile of industries and higher than 0.84 for the top quar-
tile. The correlation between the estimated price-cost mark-up assuming that
labor is priced competitively (bµij only) and the estimate taking into account
labor market imperfections (bµij) is found to be 0.34. The correlation between
the price-cost mark-up estimate (bµij) and the estimated relative extent of rent
sharing (bγij) amounts to 0.45. Comparing the upper part of Table 3 with Table
5, it follows that the match between the industry and the firm estimates is quite
good for bµ only and bµ, but far less so for bγ and φˆ.
<Insert Table 5 about here>
5.4 Determinants of estimated heterogeneity
In this subsection, we investigate whether firm-level variables, like size, capital
intensity, being a mixed or pure R&D firm and distance to the industry tech-
nology frontier, explain part of the estimated heterogeneity in the price-cost
mark-up and relative extent of rent sharing parameters. First, we discuss the
data. Then, we analyze whether the firm-level variables influence µˆ and bγ at
the firm level.
Data description
We only consider the economically meaningful firm estimates as dependent vari-
ables. More specifically, the dependent variable is either the vector of ln(bµi
only− 1) (i = 1, ..., 1239), the vector of ln(bµi− 1) (i = 1, ..., 5906) or the vector
36
of ln(bγi) (i = 1, ..., 5906).38 For each of these dependent variables, we have
four diﬀerent matrices of regressors. Each set consists of a firm-level variable
(size, capital intensity, the R&D identifier, distance to the industry technology
frontier) and industry dummies. All variables are centered around the industry
mean.
Size (ni) is measured by the logarithm of the average number of employees in
each firm. Based on the standard rent sharing literature, firm size and the
relative rent sharing parameter are expected to be positively correlated. To
the extent that large firms are typically multi-product firms, we might expect a
positive correlation between firm size and price-cost mark-ups (Sutton, 1998).
Capital intensity is usually included in structure-performance models to cap-
ture the diﬀerence between capital-intensive and non-capital intensive firms.
We measure this variable (capinti) by the logarithm of the gross book-value
of fixed assets divided by sales. Since capital equipments usually constitute
sunk costs and the latter may necessitate mark-up pricing, we expect a positive
correlation between capital intensity and price-cost mark-ups (see e.g. Odagiri
and Yamashita, 1987). Likewise, capital intensity is expected to be positively
correlated with the relative extent of rent sharing. The intuition is that if a
bargaining partner receives extra income in case of a disagreement, this partner
is more willing to tolerate disagreement and hence bargains for a larger share
38Consistent with Section 5.2, we consider two subsamples. The first subsample consists of
?µi ≥ 1 and ?φi ∈ [0, 1] (5906 estimates) and the second subsample consists of ?φi = 0 and ?µi
only ≥ 1 (1239 estimates).
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of the pie. In some studies (see e.g. Doiron 1992), these costs are interpreted
as strike costs in case the negotiating parties use strikes as a dispute resolution
mechanism. Among other things, lower inventories and higher capital intensity
are shown to increase a firm’s strike costs and hence to decrease its extent of
rent sharing (see e.g. Clark 1991, 1993; Doiron 1992).
Technological change (either captured by our R&D variable or our measure of
the distance of a firm to its industry technology frontier) might exert an eﬀect
on the relative extent of rent sharing by impacting the nature of the produc-
tion process. As discussed above, this eﬀect is, a priori, unclear. It depends
on the importance of labor costs in the firm’s total costs and on the workers’
essentiality in the production process (Betcherman, 1991). Horn and Wolinsky
(1988) develop a similar argument. To construct the R&D variable, we merge
accounting information of the considered firms from EAE (SESSI) with data
of Research & Development collected by DEP (”Ministe`re de l’Education et
de la Recherche”). The R&D surveys (DEP) provide two R&D variables: a
dichotomous R&D indicator and total R&D expenditure. We assume that the
sample is exhaustive, i.e., a firm which does not report any R&D expenditure is
considered to be a non-R&D firm. Based on this criterion, we define three sub-
samples: the pure non-R&D firms, the mixed R&D firms for which we have data
on R&D expenditure for less than 12 years (mixentri) and the pure R&D firms
for which we have data on R&D expenditure for at least 12 years (rdentri).39
39Among the 5906 firms in the first subsample, 182 firms are identified as pure R&D firms,
584 as mixed R&D firms and -the complement- 5140 as pure non-R&D firms. The second
subsample of 1239 firms includes 75 pure R&D firms, 177 mixed R&D firms and 987 pure
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Our measure of the distance of a firm to its industry technology frontier takes
the following form disti = p95 ln
¡V A
N
¢
j − ln
¡V A
N
¢
ij , where i is a firm index, j
a industry index and V AN value added per employee. We use the 95
th percentile,
instead of the maximum, to drop outliers.
Results
The OLS, WLS, where the weight is defined as the inverse of the sampling vari-
ance, and the median regression coeﬃcients of the set of regressors explaining
the vector of ln(bµi only − 1), the vector of ln(bµi − 1) or the vector of ln(bγi)
are reported in Table 6. The 0.50 quantile regression can be interpreted as a
robust equivalent of OLS. Although the regression coeﬃcients are listed in rows
for each of the three sets of regressors, they are for single firm-level variable re-
gressions (including industry dummies), except for the regression including the
R&D identifier which includes two firm-level variables (mixentri) and (rdentri)
and industry dummies. Large firms experience a negative eﬀect on the esti-
mated price-cost mark-up taking into account labor market imperfections, and
on the corresponding relative extent of rent sharing while capital-intensive firms
experience a positive impact on the estimated price-cost mark-up but a nega-
tive impact on the corresponding relative extent of rent sharing. Being a R&D
firm exerts a negative eﬀect on the relative extent of rent sharing. This eﬀect
is strongest for the pure R&D firms. Firms which are nearer to the indus-
try technology frontier experience a positive eﬀect on the estimated price-cost
mark-up. This impact becomes negative when labor market imperfections are
non-R&D firms.
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taken into consideration. Hence, consistent with the across-industry results,
low-technology firms experience a positive eﬀect on the price-cost mark-up and
the corresponding relative extent of rent sharing.
As a robustness check, we ran multivariate specifications for each set of regres-
sors where we include all firm-level variables and industry dummies.40 The
results discussed above are not sensitive to using these multivariate specifica-
tions, except for the negative eﬀect of being a capital-intensive firm or a R&D
firm on the estimated extent of rent sharing. More specifically, the former eﬀect
looses significance, while the latter eﬀect becomes significantly positive with the
eﬀect being strongest for the pure R&D firms.
<Insert Table 6 about here>
6 Conclusion
This article thoroughly investigates product and labor market imperfections
as two sources of discrepancies between the output contribution of individual
production factors and their respective revenue shares. By doing so, we con-
tribute to the econometric productivity literature on estimating microeconomic
production functions and to the recent econometric literature on simultaneously
estimating imperfections in product and factor markets. Embedding the eﬃcient
bargaining model into the R. Hall (1988) approach shows that the firm price-
cost mark-up and the extent of rent sharing generate a wedge between marginal
40Results not reported but available upon request.
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products of input factors and the apparent factor prices. To econometrically ex-
plore these particular sources of discrepancies, we start by estimating a standard
production function using a panel of 10646 French manufacturing firms cover-
ing the period 1978-2001. From the production function coeﬃcients, i.e., the
output elasticities, we derive our parameters of interest. At the manufacturing
level, the first-diﬀerenced OLS estimates point to an average price-cost mark-up
of 1.17 and an average extent of rent sharing of 0.44. The next step into our
empirical strategy is to examine across-industry heterogeneity in the produc-
tion function coeﬃcients and the retrieved parameters. Splitting the sample
into 38 industries, we find a considerable degree of across-industry heterogene-
ity. The median price-cost mark-up and the median extent of rent sharing are
estimated at 1.15 and 0.12 respectively. The median values of the economically
meaningful industry estimates are of an order of magnitude of 1.18 and 0.27
respectively. Highly profitable industries display a price-cost mark-up that is
higher than the median value. Low-technology industries display a price-cost
mark-up and extent of rent sharing above the respective median values. Weakly
unionized industries are characterized by a price-cost mark-up below the re-
spective median value. The estimated extent of rent sharing of half of those
industries is lower than the respective median value. Industries faced by high
import competition show an estimated price-cost mark-up below the median
value. The estimated extent of rent sharing in industries that are shielded from
import competition exceeds the median value. Since production behavior is
likely to vary across firms, we finally take into account firm-level heterogeneity
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and look at within-industry heterogeneity. To determine the degree of hetero-
geneity in the production function coeﬃcients and parameters of interest, we
adopt the Swamy (1970) methodology as a variance decomposition approach.
This method allows us to estimate the variance components of heterogeneity,
i.e., the pure sampling variance and the true heterogeneity or dispersion. The
median of the firm estimates of the price-cost mark-up ignoring the occurrence
of rent sharing is of 1.10, while it is higher of 1.20 when taking them into account
and the median of the corresponding firm estimates of the extent of rent sharing
is of 0.62. The Swamy corresponding robust estimates of true dispersion of 0.18,
0.37 and 0.35 are good indicators of a credible amount of heterogeneity. Firm
size, capital intensity, distance to the industry technology frontier and invest-
ing in R&D seem to explain part of the estimated heterogeneity in price-cost
mark-ups and the extent of rent sharing.
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Table 1
Summary statistics
Variables 1978-2001
Mean Sd. Q1 Q3 N
Real firm output growth rate ∆q 0.021 0.152 -0.061 0.103 154363
Labor growth rate ∆n 0.006 0.123 -0.043 0.054 154363
Capital growth rate ∆k -0.001 0.151 -0.072 0.060 154363
Materials growth rate ∆m 0.040 0.192 -0.060 0.139 154363
Labor share in nominal output αN 0.307 0.136 0.208 0.387 165009
Materials share in nominal output αM 0.503 0.159 0.399 0.614 165009
∆q −∆k 0.022 0.188 -0.081 0.126 154363
∆n−∆k 0.007 0.166 -0.073 0.088 154363
∆m−∆k 0.041 0.220 -0.079 0.160 154363
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Table 2
Estimates of output elasticities bεQJ (J = N,M,K), mark-up µˆ (only) and extent of rent sharing φˆ :
Full sample: 10646 firms, each firm between 12 and 24 years of observations - Period 1978-2001
Part 1: Imposing constant returns to scale: bεQK = 1− bεQN − bεQM
STATIC SPECIFICATION DYNAMIC SPECIFICATION
OLS
LEVELS
OLS
DIF
GMM DIF
(t− 2)(t− 3)
GMM SYS
(t− 2)(t− 3)
GMM DIF
(t− 2)(t− 3)
GMM SYS
(t− 2)(t− 3)bεQN 0.331(0.003) 0.298(0.003) 0.138(0.020) 0.298(0.008) 0.134(0.032) 0.201(0.015)bεQM 0.592(0.003) 0.587(0.003) 0.726(0.017) 0.675(0.007) 0.595(0.022) 0.541(0.019)bεQK 0.077 0.115 0.137 0.027 0.271 0.258
λ 1 1 1 1 1 1
bµ only = ?µ onlyλ 1.144(0.003) 1.112(0.002) 1.129(0.013) 1.211(0.007) 1.041(0.032) 0.934(0.020)
bµ = ?µλ 1.177(0.007) 1.167(0.005) 1.443(0.033) 1.342(0.015) 1.184(0.043) 1.076(0.039)bφ 0.393
(0.006)
0.440
(0.004)
0.619
(0.009)
0.490
(0.008)
0.605
(0.018)
0.534
(0.015)bρ 0.713
(0.023)
0.619
(0.018)
Part 2: Not imposing constant returns to scale: bεQK = bλ− bεQN − bεQM
STATIC SPECIFICATION DYNAMIC SPECIFICATION
OLS
LEVELS
OLS
DIF
GMM DIF
(t− 2)(t− 3)
GMM SYS
(t− 2)(t− 3)
GMM DIF
(t− 2)(t− 3)
GMM SYS
(t− 2)(t− 3)bεQN 0.331(0.001) 0.189(0.002) 0.149(0.022) 0.240(0.011) 0.111(0.031) 0.057(0.025)bεQM 0.592(0.001) 0.554(0.002) 0.566(0.020) 0.696(0.008) 0.554(0.023) 0.562(0.020)bεQK 0.077(0.002) 0.049(0.003) -0.027(0.038) 0.033(0.017) 0.033(0.057) 0.241(0.027)bλ 1
(0.0006)
0.792
(0.003)
0.688
(0.020)
0.969
(0.004)
0.803
(0.052)
0.860
(0.025)
bµonly 1.153
(0.004)
1.011
(0.004)
0.890
(0.022)
1.219
(0.008)
1.011
(0.035)
0.916
(0.033)
?µ only
?λ
1.145
(0.003)
1.189
(0.003)
1.398
(0.035)
1.212
(0.007)
1.074
(0.054)
0.897
(0.022)
bµ 1.177
(0.002)
1.102
(0.004)
1.126
(0.039)
1.383
(0.016)
1.100
(0.046)
1.117
(0.041)bφ 0.395
(0.002)
0.552
(0.002)
0.589
(0.015)
0.549
(0.007)
0.615
(0.017)
0.651
(0.011)
?µ
?λ
1.178
(0.002)
1.392
(0.006)
1.637
(0.055)
1.427
(0.020)
1.371
(0.088)
1.299
(0.057)bρ 0.723
(0.023)
0.609
(0.020)
Robust standard errors and first-step robust standard errors in columns 1-2 and columns 3-6 respectively.
Time dummies are included but not reported.
(1) Input shares: αN = 0.307, αM = 0.503, αK = 0.190.
(2) GMM DIF : the set of instruments includes the lagged levels of n, m and k dated (t− 2) and (t− 3).
(3) GMM SY S: the set of instruments includes the lagged levels of n, m and k dated (t− 2) and (t− 3) in the first-diﬀerenced
equations and correspondingly the lagged first-diﬀerences of n, m and k dated (t− 1) in the levels equations.
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Table 3
Summary industry analysis: Estimated industry-level output elasticities bεQJj (J = N,M,K), mark-up µˆj (only) and extent of rent sharing φˆj a
OLS DIF
αNj αMj αKj bεQNj bεQMj bεQKj µˆj only µˆj bγj φˆjbµj ≥ 1 ∨ bφj ∈ [0, 1] [24 industries]b
Industry mean 0.323 0.495 0.182 0.300 (0.014) 0.586 (0.012) 0.113 (0.011) 1.111 (0.013) 1.188 (0.023) 0.399 (0.088) 0.257 (0.052)
Industry Q1 0.285 0.470 0.165 0.274 (0.011) 0.557 (0.009) 0.091 (0.009) 1.075 (0.011) 1.152 (0.020) 0.154 (0.059) 0.134 (0.029)
Industry median 0.322 0.487 0.180 0.292 (0.014) 0.581 (0.011) 0.107 (0.011) 1.113 (0.013) 1.175 (0.022) 0.365 (0.077) 0.267 (0.036)
Industry Q3 0.343 0.529 0.202 0.330 (0.016) 0.637 (0.014) 0.130 (0.014) 1.143 (0.016) 1.219 (0.028) 0.633 (0.114) 0.388 (0.077)bφj = 0 ∨ bµj only ≥ 1 [14 industries]c
Industry mean 0.239 0.560 0.201 0.321 (0.019) 0.570 (0.018) 0.108 (0.015) 1.083 (0.020) 1.022 (0.032) -0.367 (0.137) -0.783 (0.538)
Industry Q1 0.201 0.530 0.188 0.279 (0.016) 0.532 (0.015) 0.091 (0.013) 1.058 (0.016) 0.974 (0.028) -0.594 (0.115) -1.464 (0.168)
Industry median 0.240 0.548 0.203 0.338 (0.021) 0.553 (0.019) 0.104 (0.016) 1.085 (0.020) 1.017 (0.033) -0.370 (0.141) -0.593 (0.385)
Industry Q3 0.300 0.579 0.219 0.365 (0.022) 0.638 (0.021) 0.123 (0.017) 1.102 (0.025) 1.053 (0.037) -0.212 (0.157) -0.270 (0.942)
Full sample [38 industries]
Industry mean 0.292 0.519 0.189 0.308 (0.016) 0.580 (0.014) 0.111 (0.013) 1.101 (0.016) 1.125 (0.027) 0.117 (0.106) -0.126 (0.231)
Industry Q1 0.257 0.480 0.170 0.275 (0.012) 0.541 (0.010) 0.091 (0.010) 1.066 (0.011) 1.041 (0.021) -0.230 (0.073) -0.299 (0.034)
Industry median 0.305 0.516 0.187 0.302 (0.016) 0.573 (0.013) 0.106 (0.013) 1.092 (0.015) 1.150 (0.025) 0.136 (0.106) 0.120 (0.077)
Industry Q3 0.333 0.552 0.213 0.340 (0.020) 0.638 (0.017) 0.123 (0.016) 1.135 (0.019) 1.188 (0.033) 0.489 (0.138) 0.328 (0.242)
GMM SYS (t− 2)(t− 3)
αNj αMj αKj bεQNj bεQMj bεQKj µˆj only µˆj bγj φˆjbµj ≥ 1 ∨ bφj ∈ [0, 1] [26 industries]b
Industry mean 0.311 0.502 0.187 0.312 (0.034) 0.645 (0.030) 0.043 (0.026) 1.193 (0.031) 1.291 (0.060) 0.389 (0.196) 0.243 (0.119)
Industry Q1 0.265 0.470 0.170 0.267 (0.030) 0.606 (0.025) 0.018 (0.022) 1.147 (0.025) 1.249 (0.048) 0.065 (0.132) 0.061 (0.056)
Industry median 0.322 0.493 0.182 0.304 (0.035) 0.657 (0.030) 0.040 (0.026) 1.191 (0.031) 1.278 (0.059) 0.415 (0.196) 0.292 (0.108)
Industry Q3 0.341 0.529 0.208 0.359 (0.039) 0.682 (0.034) 0.075 (0.030) 1.244 (0.036) 1.328 (0.072) 0.536 (0.239) 0.349 (0.164)bφj = 0 ∨ bµj only ≥ 1 [11 industries]c
Industry mean 0.255 0.552 0.193 0.347 (0.043) 0.624 (0.038) 0.029 (0.035) 1.193 (0.042) 1.133 (0.069) -0.273 (0.290) -0.468 (0.672)
Industry Q1 0.230 0.530 0.152 0.328 (0.039) 0.581 (0.035) -0.003 (0.027) 1.157 (0.033) 1.081 (0.060) -0.488 (0.198) -0.955 (0.267)
Industry median 0.258 0.553 0.202 0.341 (0.042) 0.626 (0.038) 0.028 (0.030) 1.186 (0.037) 1.115 (0.067) -0.262 (0.226) -0.356 (0.419)
Industry Q3 0.312 0.579 0.229 0.364 (0.047) 0.652 (0.042) 0.055 (0.048) 1.228 (0.058) 1.170 (0.076) -0.109 (0.386) -0.122 (0.894)
Full sample [38 industries]d
Industry mean 0.292 0.519 0.189 0.325 (0.037) 0.637 (0.033) 0.038 (0.029) 1.189 (0.035) 1.236 (0.063) 0.154 (0.227) 0.173 (0.463)
Industry Q1 0.257 0.480 0.170 0.295 (0.032) 0.600 (0.027) 0.009 (0.024) 1.147 (0.026) 1.149 (0.052) -0.109 (0.153) -0.039 (0.084)
Industry median 0.305 0.516 0.187 0.331 (0.039) 0.638 (0.032) 0.028 (0.028) 1.187 (0.033) 1.254 (0.063) 0.071 (0.210) 0.112 (0.164)
Industry Q3 0.333 0.552 0.213 0.359 (0.042) 0.676 (0.039) 0.075 (0.035) 1.243 (0.039) 1.312 (0.074) 0.503 (0.290) 0.337 (0.289)
Robust standard errors (OLS DIF) and first-step robust standard errors (GMM SYS) in parentheses.
a Detailed information on the industry-level estimates is presented in Table A.3.a in Appendix.
b These subsamples have 21 industries in common.
c The intersection between the two subsamples contains 8 industries.
d For industry 1, bφj > 1, but insignificantly so.
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Table 4
Heterogeneity of firm output elasticities bεQJi (J = N,M,K), mark-up µˆi (only) and extent of rent sharing φˆi :
Diﬀerent indicators and first-diﬀerenced OLS estimatesa
αNi αMi αKi bεQNi bεQMi bεQKi µˆi only µˆi bγi φˆibµi ≥ 1 ∨ bφi ∈ [0, 1] [5906 firms]
Simple mean
Observed dispersion bσo
True dispersion bσtrue
0.335
(0.130)
[0.130]
0.489
(0.138)
[0.134]
0.175
(0.089)
[0.084]
0.132
(0.224)
[0.063]
0.736
(0.197)
[0.114]
0.131
(0.205)
[0.084]
1.148
(0.276)
[0.173]
1.580
(0.533)
[0.315]
1.859
(1.759)
[1.126]
0.544
(0.214)
[0]
Weighted mean
Weighted observed dispersion bσo
Weighted true dispersion bσtrue
0.368
(0.138)
[0.138]
0.559
(0.141)
[0.141]
0.251
(0.138)
[0.138]
0.132
(0.167)
[0.122]
0.730
(0.184)
[0.158]
0.080
(0.141)
[0.109]
1.137
(0.170)
[0.134]
1.367
(0.295)
[0.237]
1.328
(1.175)
[1.104]
0.813
(0.114)
[0.109]
Median
Interquartile observed dispersion bσo
Robust true dispersion bσtrue
0.322
(0.138)
[0.138]
0.495
(0.158)
[0.155]
0.150
(0.105)
[0.100]
0.137
(0.192)
[0.109]
0.737
(0.195)
[0.148]
0.111
(0.173)
[0.109]
1.134
(0.212)
[0.141]
1.442
(0.387)
[0.279]
1.384
(1.391)
[1.158]
0.580
(0.237)
[0.202]bφi = 0 ∨ bµi only ≥ 1 [1239 firms]
Simple mean
Observed dispersion bσo
True dispersion bσtrue
0.252
(0.100)
[0.100]
0.508
(0.134)
[0.130]
0.239
(0.118)
[0.114]
0.417
(0.158)
[0]
0.594
(0.164)
[0]
-0.012
(0.167)
[0]
1.298
(0.277)
[0.167]
1.186
(0.239)
[0]
-0.437
(0.286)
[0]
-4.687
(26.192)
[0]
Weighted mean
Weighted observed dispersion bσo
Weighted true dispersion bσtrue
0.275
(0.109)
[0.109]
0.590
(0.141)
[0.141]
0.352
(0.158)
[0.158]
0.366
(0.148)
[0.071]
0.621
(0.161)
[0.130]
0.007
(0.114)
[0.063]
1.187
(0.170)
[0.141]
1.137
(0.155)
[0]
-0.282
(0.257)
[0]
-0.139
(0.192)
[0]
Median
Interquartile observed dispersion bσo
Robust true dispersion bσtrue
0.241
(0.109)
[0.109]
0.520
(0.170)
[0.167]
0.201
(0.152)
[0.148]
0.402
(0.152)
[0]
0.593
(0.167)
[0.105]
0.008
(0.134)
[0]
1.222
(0.224)
[0.167]
1.134
(0.192)
[0]
-0.416
(0.366)
[0]
-0.712
(1.340)
[0]
Full sample [10646 firms]
Simple mean
Observed dispersion bσo
True dispersion bσtrue
0.307
(0.126)
[0.126]
0.503
(0.138)
[0.134]
0.190
(0.100)
[0.095]
0.288
(0.305)
[0.195]
0.599
(0.257)
[0.195]
0.112
(0.241)
[0.130]
1.097
(0.310)
[0.212]
1.238
(0.610)
[0.443]
-0.880
(56)
[0]
0.583
(18)
[0]
Weighted mean
Weighted observed dispersion bσo
Weighted true dispersion bσtrue
0.339
(0.138)
[0.138]
0.570
(0.141)
[0.141]
0.278
(0.148)
[0.148]
0.222
(0.232)
[0.197]
0.627
(0.234)
[0.212]
0.071
(0.161)
[0.126]
1.107
(0.195)
[0.161]
1.172
(0.373)
[0.327]
1.129
(1.272)
[1.167]
0.822
(0.122)
[0.114]
Median
Interquartile observed dispersion bσo
Robust true dispersion bσtrue
0.291
(0.134)
[0.134]
0.510
(0.161)
[0.158]
0.160
(0.114)
[0.109]
0.262
(0.277)
[0.217]
0.613
(0.261)
[0.226]
0.094
(0.197)
[0.138]
1.096
(0.245)
[0.184]
1.200
(0.457)
[0.367]
0.528
(1.950)
[1.578]
0.617
(0.435)
[0.348]
a Detailed information on the firm-level estimates is presented in Table A.4 in Appendix.
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Table 5
Within-industry dispersion: Weighted mean and Swamy estimate of weighted true standard deviation (bσtrue) of bεQJij ,
mark-up µˆij(only) and extent of rent sharing φˆij
a
OLS DIFbεQNij bεQMij bεQKij µˆij only µˆij bγij φˆij
24 industries
Industry mean 0.236 [0.012] 0.625 [0.012] 0.076 [0.010] 1.106 [0.010] 1.194 [0.020] 1.146 [0.072] 0.792 [0.007]
Industry Q1 0.207 [0.009] 0.580 [0.010] 0.057 [0.008] 1.082 [0.008] 1.161 [0.015] 0.979 [0.045] 0.757 [0.004]
Industry median 0.224 [0.011] 0.628 [0.011] 0.073 [0.010] 1.108 [0.009] 1.194 [0.017] 1.130 [0.067] 0.779 [0.007]
Industry Q3 0.266 [0.014] 0.664 [0.014] 0.087 [0.012] 1.117 [0.012] 1.231 [0.021] 1.293 [0.090] 0.853 [0.008]
Correlation with
industry estimatesb
0.750 [0.845] 0.791 [0.785] 0.626 [0.884] 0.565 [0.897] 0.455 [0.798] 0.670 [0.823] 0.316 [0.653]
14 industries
Industry mean 0.227 [0.015] 0.635 [0.018] 0.062 [0.013] 1.106 [0.013] 1.085 [0.024] 0.682 [0.066] 0.776 [0.013]
Industry Q1 0.165 [0.012] 0.574 [0.014] 0.047 [0.010] 1.088 [0.011] 1.055 [0.020] 0.534 [0.047] 0.718 [0.009]
Industry median 0.234 [0.015] 0.630 [0.017] 0.059 [0.012] 1.102 [0.012] 1.085 [0.023] 0.678 [0.066] 0.788 [0.010]
Industry Q3 0.289 [0.019] 0.680 [0.020] 0.074 [0.015] 1.109 [0.014] 1.097 [0.028] 0.813 [0.078] 0.820 [0.016]
Correlation with
industry estimatesb
0.889 [0.753] 0.841 [0.694] -0.046 [0.657] 0.266 [0617] 0.273 [0.438] 0.689 [0.293] 0.484 [0.621]
38 industries
Industry mean 0.232 [0.013] 0.629 [0.014] 0.071 [0.011] 1.106 [0.011] 1.154 [0.021] 0.975 [0.070] 0.786 [0.009]
Industry Q1 0.199 [0.010] 0.577 [0.011] 0.051 [0.009] 1.086 [0.008] 1.085 [0.016] 0.686 [0.046] 0.757 [0.005]
Industry median 0.224 [0.013] 0.630 [0.013] 0.069 [0.010] 1.106 [0.011] 1.161 [0.019] 1.005 [0.066] 0.780 [0.008]
Industry Q3 0.273 [0.016] 0.669 [0.017] 0.083 [0.013] 1.117 [0.014] 1.221 [0.026] 1.242 [0.081] 0.837 [0.010]
Correlation with
industry estimatesb
0.789 [0.828] 0.793 [0.830] 0.470 [0.812] 0.460 [0.761] 0.712 [0.680] 0.795 [0.471] 0.318 [0.732]
a Detailed information on the within-industry estimates is presented in Table A.5 in Appendix.
b Estimates reported in Table A.3.a, Part 1-2.
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Table 6
Determinants of firm-level ln(µˆi only − 1), ln(µˆi − 1) and ln(bγi):
OLS, WLS and median regression coeﬃcients
Variables ni capinti mixentri rdentri disti
βˆOLS
ln(µˆi only − 1)
0.040
(0.031)
-0.023
(0.054)
0.083
(0.085)
-0.087
(0.157)
-0.512∗∗∗
(0.111)
ln(µˆi − 1)
-0.048∗∗∗
(0.014)
0.066∗∗∗
(0.021)
-0.143∗∗∗
(0.047)
-0.101
(0.080)
0.158∗∗∗
(0.047)
ln(bγi) -0.210∗∗∗(0.015) -0.088∗∗∗(0.023) -0.226∗∗∗(0.049) -0.419∗∗∗(0.084) 0.949∗∗∗(0.051)
βˆWLS
ln(µˆi only − 1)
-0.058
(0.049)
-0.031
(0.054)
-0.020
(0.075)
-0.159∗
(0.084)
-0.065
(0.128)
ln(µˆi − 1)
-0.048∗∗∗
(0.016)
0.140∗∗∗
(0.025)
-0.097∗
(0.055)
-0.179∗∗∗
(0.070)
0.251∗∗∗
(0.058)
ln(bγi) -0.191∗∗∗(0.029) -0.127∗∗∗(0.047) -0.299∗∗∗(0.095) -0.508∗∗∗(0.087) 0.750∗∗∗(0.115)
βˆ(0.50)
ln(µˆi only − 1)
0.081
(0.026)
0.025
(0.070)
0.110
(0.100)
0.247∗
(0.146)
-0.513∗∗∗
(0.115)
ln(µˆi − 1)
-0.032∗∗
(0.015)
0.105∗∗∗
(0.018)
-0.069
(0.052)
-0.047
(0.090)
0.182∗∗∗
(0.054)
ln(bγi) -0.222∗∗∗(0.014) -0.096∗∗∗(0.023) -0.234∗∗∗(0.055) -0.418∗∗∗(0.094) 0.942∗∗∗(0.050)
∗∗∗ Significant at 1%; ∗∗ Significant at 5%; ∗ Significant at 10%. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
(1) The vector of ln(bµi only − 1) includes 1239 estimates, the vector of ln(bµi − 1) or ln(bγi) consists of 5906 estimates.
(2) The dependent and the explanatory variables are centered around the industry mean.
(3) The coeﬃcients are for single firm-level variable regressions (including industry dummies), except for the regression
including the R&D identifier which includes two firm-level variables (mixentri and rdentri) and industry dummies.
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Graph 4   Openness differences across industries
 
φ j?
µ j?
6
13
17
18 
7
12
16 
23
26
33
36
5
11
14 
20 
27
37
8
15 22 24 28
30 
35
1.05
1.1 
1.15
1.2 
1.25
1.3 
 
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 
 
low medium low
medium high high
Source: Table A.3.a [Part 1] estimates
Graph 3   Unionization differences across industries 
µ j?
φ j?
Appendix A: Detailed results
Table A.1
Estimates of output elasticities bεQJ (J = N,M,K), mark-up µˆ (only) and extent of rent sharing φˆ :
Balanced sample: 473 firms, each firm 24 years of observations - Period 1978-2001
STATIC SPECIFICATION DYNAMIC SPECIFICATION
OLS
LEVELS
OLS
DIF
GMM DIF
(t− 2)
GMM SYS
(t− 2)
GMM DIF
(t− 2)
GMM SYS
(t− 2)bεQN 0.257(0.016) 0.320(0.011) 0.134(0.067) 0.241(0.022) 0.302(0.032) 0.262(0.028)bεQM 0.646(0.015) 0.586(0.011) 0.664(0.051) 0.666(0.022) 0.602(0.023) 0.628(0.023)bεQK 0.097 0.094 0.202 0.093 0.096 0.110
λ 1 1 1 1 1 1
bµ only = ?µonlyλ 1.208(0.014) 1.190(0.011) 1.121(0.042) 1.213(0.023) 1.204(0.026) 1.159(0.028)
bµ = ?µλ 1.319(0.031) 1.197(0.023) 1.357(0.105) 1.359(0.045) 1.230(0.048) 1.282(0.048)bφ 0.345
(0.024)
0.182
(0.033)
0.481
(0.053)
0.374
(0.029)
0.230
(0.068)
0.328
(0.044)bρ 0.712
(0.022)
0.390
(0.035)
Robust standard errors and first-step robust standard errors in columns 1-2 and columns 3-6 respectively.
Time dummies are included but not reported.
(1) bε QK = 1− bεQN − bεQM .
(2) Input shares: αN = 0.270, αM = 0.490, αK = 0.240.
(3) GMM DIF : the set of instruments includes the lagged levels of n, m and k dated (t− 2) and earlier.
(4) GMM SY S: the set of instruments includes the lagged levels of n, m and k dated (t− 2) and earlier in the
first-diﬀerenced equations and the lagged first-diﬀerences of n, m and k dated (t− 1) in the levels equations.
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Table A.2
Industry repartition
Industry Code Name
Profit.a
type
Tech.b
type
Union.c
type
Imp.d
type
# Obs.
(# Firms)
Ind 1 B01 Meat preparations L L ML L 4881 (324)
Ind 2 B02 Milk products L L MH L 1981 (122)
Ind 3 B03 Beverages H L H L 1705 (106)
Ind 4 B04 Food production for animals MH L L L 1942 (126)
Ind 5 B05-B06 Other food products MH L MH ML 7835 (518)
Ind 6 C11 Clothing and skin goods MH L L H 6938 (453)
Ind 7 C12 Leather goods and footwear H L ML H 3400 (213)
Ind 8 C20 Publishing, (re)printing ML L H L 10919 (724)
Ind 9 C31 Pharmaceutical products H H L ML 2153 (130)
Ind 10 C32 Soap, perfume and maintenance products ML MH L L 1877 (114)
Ind 11 C41 Furniture ML L MH ML 5043 (322)
Ind 12 C42, C44-C46 Accommodation equipment MH MH ML H 2871 (179)
Ind 13 C43 Sport articles, games and other products MH ML L H 2390 (156)
Ind 14 D01 Motor vehicles MH MH MH MH 2064 (133)
Ind 15 D02 Transport equipment H ML H MH 2177 (129)
Ind 16 E11-E14 Ship building, aircraft and railway construction L ML ML ML 1834 (110)
Ind 17 E21 Metal products for construction L ML L L 2590 (171)
Ind 18 E22 Ferruginous and steam boilers L ML L L 4461 (294)
Ind 19 E23 Mechanical equipment MH MH ML H 3020 (182)
Ind 20 E24 Machinery for general usage L ML MH MH 4151 (268)
Ind 21 E25-E26 Agriculture machinery ML ML ML H 2391 (154)
Ind 22 E27-E28 Other machinery for specific usage L ML H MH 4355 (286)
Ind 23 E31-E35 Electric and electronic machinery H H ML H 2934 (203)
Ind 24 F11-F12 Mineral products H L H MH 3099 (205)
Ind 25 F13 Glass products H ML H ML 1681 (104)
Ind 26 F14 Earthenware products and construction material H ML ML ML 6109 (391)
Ind 27 F21 Textile art L L MH ML 4338 (270)
Ind 28 F22-F23 Textile products and clothing ML L H H 4858 (310)
Ind 29 F31 Wooden products ML L L ML 7170 (475)
Ind 30 F32-F33 Paper and printing products MH L H MH 5312 (330)
Ind 31 F41-F42 Mineral and organic chemical products ML MH MH H 3026 (192)
Ind 32 F43-F45 Parachemical and rubber products MH MH H MH 2759 (171)
Ind 33 F46 Transformation of plastic products L ML ML ML 9037 (600)
Ind 34 F51-F52 Steel products, non-ferrous metals ML ML MH H 2024 (125)
Ind 35 F53 Ironware ML L H L 2247 (138)
Ind 36 F54 Industrial service to metal products L L ML L 14930 (1000)
Ind 37 F55-F56 Metal products, recuperation H L MH MH 9314 (599)
Ind 38 F61-F62 Electrical goods and components MH H L MH 5193 (319)
L: low-type, ML: medium low-type, MH: medium high-type, H: high-type.
a L: PCM< 19% (10 industries),ML: 19%≤PCM< 22% (9 industries),MH: 22%≤ PCM< 24% (10 industries), H: PCM≥ 24%
(9 industries).
b L (17 industries), ML (6 industries), MH (12 industries), H (3 industries).
c L: union density< 6.7% (9 industries),ML: 6.7%≤union density< 10.2% (10 industries),MH: 10.2%≤union density< 12.9% (9 industries),
H: union density≥ 12.9% (10 industries).
d L: import penetration< 0.15 (10 industries), ML: 0.15≤ import penetration < 0.27 (9 industries), MH: 0.27≤ import penetration < 0.36
(10 industries), H: import penetration ≥ 0.36 (9 industries).
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Table A.3.a
Industry analysis: Estimated industry-level output elasticities bεQJj (J = N,M,K), mark-up µˆj (only) and extent of rent sharing φˆj
Part 1: OLS DIF: bµj ≥ 1 ∨ bφj ∈ [0, 1] [24 industries]
OLS DIF
Industry # Firms αNj αMj αKj bεQNj bεQMj bεQKj µˆj only µˆj bγj φˆj
Ind 6 453 0.424 0.398 0.178 0.370 (0.011) 0.457 (0.008) 0.173 (0.009) 1.037 (0.011) 1.150 (0.020) 0.573 (0.073) 0.364 (0.029)
Ind 18 294 0.406 0.482 0.112 0.341 (0.011) 0.556 (0.008) 0.103 (0.010) 1.053 (0.011) 1.153 (0.017) 0.992 (0.114) 0.498 (0.029)
Ind 17 171 0.286 0.594 0.120 0.265 (0.016) 0.645 (0.013) 0.090 (0.014) 1.054 (0.015) 1.085 (0.022) 0.352 (0.153) 0.261 (0.084)
Ind 20 268 0.313 0.535 0.152 0.322 (0.015) 0.574 (0.012) 0.103 (0.012) 1.063 (0.013) 1.073 (0.021) 0.083 (0.124) 0.077 (0.106)
Ind 16 110 0.345 0.496 0.159 0.352 (0.021) 0.536 (0.015) 0.112 (0.018) 1.066 (0.019) 1.081 (0.030) 0.122 (0.163) 0.109 (0.129)
Ind 22 286 0.379 0.482 0.139 0.313 (0.015) 0.566 (0.011) 0.121 (0.013) 1.073 (0.014) 1.174 (0.022) 0.808 (0.115) 0.477 (0.035)
Ind 28 310 0.334 0.483 0.183 0.289 (0.012) 0.566 (0.011) 0.145 (0.010) 1.078 (0.012) 1.173 (0.023) 0.478 (0.075) 0.324 (0.035)
Ind 5 518 0.285 0.528 0.187 0.207 (0.009) 0.646 (0.011) 0.148 (0.008) 1.079 (0.011) 1.223 (0.020) 0.621 (0.049) 0.383 (0.018)
Ind 13 156 0.322 0.465 0.213 0.323 (0.018) 0.519 (0.017) 0.158 (0.017) 1.081 (0.021) 1.115 (0.037) 0.151 (0.106) 0.131 (0.080)
Ind 23 203 0.385 0.450 0.165 0.375 (0.018) 0.518 (0.014) 0.107 (0.016) 1.090 (0.018) 1.150 (0.032) 0.360 (0.132) 0.264 (0.072)
Ind 11 322 0.317 0.518 0.165 0.254 (0.011) 0.628 (0.011) 0.118 (0.010) 1.095 (0.012) 1.211 (0.022) 0.645 (0.073) 0.392 (0.027)
Ind 33 600 0.282 0.552 0.166 0.256 (0.008) 0.641 (0.008) 0.103 (0.007) 1.099 (0.008) 1.162 (0.014) 0.370 (0.054) 0.270 (0.029)
Ind 8 724 0.341 0.478 0.181 0.286 (0.008) 0.615 (0.008) 0.099 (0.005) 1.126 (0.007) 1.288 (0.016) 0.661 (0.017) 0.398 (0.017)
Ind 36 1000 0.385 0.443 0.172 0.317 (0.007) 0.577 (0.005 0.106 (0.005) 1.129 (0.006) 1.303 (0.012) 0.825 (0.017) 0.452 (0.012)
Ind 12 179 0.331 0.480 0.188 0.351 (0.016) 0.559 (0.014) 0.091 (0.012) 1.131 (0.015) 1.163 (0.029) 0.158 (0.017) 0.136 (0.080)
Ind 24 205 0.265 0.497 0.238 0.261 (0.016) 0.585 (0.012) 0.154 (0.014) 1.135 (0.016 1.177 (0.024) 0.180 (0.068) 0.153 (0.049)
Ind 7 213 0.334 0.470 0.197 0.281 (0.015) 0.596 (0.013) 0.123 (0.012) 1.138 (0.015) 1.269 (0.027) 0.569 (0.076) 0.363 (0.031)
Ind 27 270 0.309 0.514 0.178 0.274 (0.013) 0.634 (0.011) 0.091 (0.011) 1.143 (0.011) 1.235 (0.022) 0.489 (0.078 0.328 (0.035)
Ind 37 599 0.322 0.442 0.236 0.337 (0.010) 0.526 (0.009) 0.137 (0.008) 1.144 (0.012) 1.188 (0.019) 0.162 (0.049) 0.140 (0.037)
Ind 14 133 0.258 0.558 0.185 0.296 (0.020) 0.646 (0.017) 0.059 (0.014) 1.155 (0.017) 1.157 (0.031) 0.013 (0.122) 0.013 (0.119)
Ind 35 138 0.333 0.491 0.177 0.276 (0.017) 0.640 (0.016) 0.083 (0.015) 1.161 (0.018) 1.306 (0.033) 0.685 (0.093) 0.406 (0.017)
Ind 15 129 0.259 0.533 0.208 0.287 (0.017) 0.630 (0.014) 0.083 (0.014) 1.167 (0.016) 1.182 (0.026) 0.078 (0.088) 0.072 (0.075)
Ind 26 391 0.294 0.471 0.236 0.309 (0.012) 0.571 (0.011) 0.120 (0.010) 1.168 (0.013) 1.214 (0.024) 0.166 (0.060) 0.143 (0.044)
Ind 30 330 0.237 0.529 0.234 0.275 (0.012) 0.642 (0.012) 0.084 (0.008) 1.200 (0.011) 1.212 (0.022) 0.044 (0.058) 0.042 (0.053)
Total 8002 0.327 0.486 0.187 0.296 (0.002) 0.586 (0.002) 0.118 1.118 (0.003) 1.206 (0.004) 0.998 (0.011) 0.499 (0.003)
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Table A.3.a (ctd)
Industry analysis: Estimated industry-level output elasticities bεQJj (J = N,M,K), mark-up µˆj (only) and extent of rent sharing φˆj
Part 2: OLS DIF: bφj = 0 ∨ bµj only ≥ 1 [14 industries]
OLS DIF
Industry # Firms αNj αMj αKj bεQNj bεQMj bεQKj µˆj only µˆj bγj φˆj
Ind 3 106 0.183 0.579 0.238 0.288 (0.022) 0.549 (0.021) 0.163 (0.021) 1.027 (0.027) 0.949 (0.036) -0.503 (0.127) -1.013 (0.514)
Ind 21 154 0.300 0.553 0.147 0.344 (0.021) 0.556 (0.016) 0.099 (0.016) 1.037 (0.018) 1.006 (0.030) -0.284 (0.195) -0.396 (0.380)
Ind 2 122 0.137 0.693 0.170 0.234 (0.022) 0.675 (0.026) 0.092 (0.016) 1.049 (0.024) 0.974 (0.037) -0.605 (0.178) -1.534 (1.145)
Ind 32 171 0.230 0.565 0.205 0.337 (0.021) 0.541 (0.019) 0.123 (0.015) 1.058 (0.020) 0.957 (0.034) -0.594 (0.155) -1.464 (0.942)
Ind 4 126 0.116 0.681 0.202 0.240 (0.022) 0.656 (0.027) 0.104 (0.017) 1.061 (0.027) 0.963 (0.039) -0.656 (0.157) -1.908 (1.331)
Ind 19 182 0.326 0.486 0.188 0.381 (0.019) 0.502 (0.015) 0.117 (0.014) 1.070 (0.017) 1.032 (0.031) -0.230 (0.144) -0.299 (0.242)
Ind 10 114 0.250 0.531 0.219 0.339 (0.021) 0.532 (0.019) 0.129 (0.015) 1.080 (0.021) 1.002 (0.036) -0.405 (0.138) -0.679 (0.389)
Ind 1 324 0.201 0.607 0.192 0.255 (0.012) 0.639 (0.014) 0.107 (0.009) 1.090 (0.011) 1.053 (0.022) -0.212 (0.084) -0.270 (0.135)
Ind 29 475 0.257 0.538 0.205 0.292 (0.010) 0.579 (0.010) 0.128 (0.008) 1.090 (0.011) 1.076 (0.019) -0.073 (0.063) -0.079 (0.073)
Ind 31 192 0.260 0.544 0.196 0.339 (0.016) 0.566 (0.015) 0.094 (0.013) 1.100 (0.016) 1.041 (0.028) -0.336 (0.115) -0.506 (0.262)
Ind 38 319 0.330 0.500 0.170 0.365 (0.013) 0.550 (0.010) 0.085 (0.010) 1.102 (0.011) 1.100 (0.021) -0.012 (0.098) -0.012 (0.100)
Ind 9 130 0.232 0.530 0.238 0.385 (0.024) 0.527 (0.022) 0.088 (0.018) 1.122 (0.025) 0.994 (0.041) -0.653 (0.155) -1.882 (1.291)
Ind 25 104 0.312 0.459 0.229 0.423 (0.026) 0.472 (0.022) 0.105 (0.019 1.126 (0.025) 1.028 (0.048) -0.434 (0.179) -0.767 (0.560)
Ind 34 125 0.218 0.569 0.213 0.279 (0.024) 0.643 (0.019) 0.078 (0.017) 1.153 (0.020) 1.131 (0.033) -0.135 (0.125) -0.156 (0.168)
Total 2644 0.247 0.554 0.199 0.314 (0.005) 0.579 (0.004) 0.107 1.090 (0.006) 1.045 (0.008) 0.039 (0.025) 0.037 (0.024)
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Time dummies are included but not reported.
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Table A.3.a (ctd)
Industry analysis: Estimated industry-level output elasticities bεQJj (J = N,M,K), mark-up µˆj (only) and extent of rent sharing φˆj
Part 3: GMM SYS: bµj ≥ 1 ∨ bφj ∈ [0, 1] [26 industries]
GMM SYS (t− 2)(t− 3)
Industry # Firms bεQNj bεQMj bεQKj µˆj only µˆj bγj φˆj Sargan m1 m2
Ind 6 453 0.399 (0.030) 0.526 (0.017) 0.075 (0.029) 1.213 (0.033) 1.323 (0.043) 0.685 (0.157) 0.407 (0.055) 0.004 -9.91 -2.40
Ind 2 122 0.152 (0.035) 0.797 (0.024) 0.051 (0.027) 1.147 (0.025) 1.151 (0.035) 0.027 (0.192) 0.026 (0.182) 1.000 -4.03 -0.68
Ind 18 294 0.373 (0.030) 0.606 (0.030) 0.021 (0.016) 1.104 (0.018) 1.258 (0.061) 0.982 (0.33) 0.495 (0.084) 0.998 -8.24 0.59
Ind 16 110 0.342 (0.042) 0.632 (0.030) 0.026 (0.034) 1.174 (0.037) 1.276 (0.061) 0.486 (0.262) 0.327 (0.119) 1.000 -5.89 -1.79
Ind 22 286 0.261 (0.035) 0.636 (0.025) 0.103 (0.026) 1.100 (0.027) 1.320 (0.052) 1.306 (0.230) 0.566 (0.043) 0.995 -9.91 2.41
Ind 28 310 0.359 (0.042) 0.626 (0.034) 0.015 (0.027) 1.227 (0.031) 1.296 (0.070) 0.311 (0.244) 0.237 (0.142) 0.435 -8.87 -2.96
Ind 5 518 0.239 (0.016) 0.677 (0.023) 0.084 (0.022) 1.117 (0.028) 1.281 (0.043) 0.527 (0.086) 0.345 (0.037) 0.006 -9.15 -2.24
Ind 13 156 0.406 (0.041) 0.600 (0.040) -0.006 (0.035) 1.281 (0.046) 1.290 (0.086) 0.034 (0.222) 0.033 (0.208) 1.000 -7.38 0.90
Ind 23 203 0.409 (0.040) 0.563 (0.041) 0.028 (0.041) 1.162 (0.050) 1.249 (0.092) 0.348 (0.292) 0.258 (0.161) 1.000 -8.18 -2.72
Ind 29 475 0.301 (0.023) 0.665 (0.027) 0.034 (0.020) 1.220 (0.027) 1.236 (0.050) 0.064 (0.130) 0.060 (0.114) 0.619 -11.45 -2.05
Ind 11 322 0.314 (0.042) 0.698 (0.034) -0.012 (0.030) 1.247 (0.033) 1.348 (0.065) 0.503 (0.239) 0.335 (0.106) 0.676 -9.46 -2.81
Ind 33 600 0.298 (0.034) 0.654 (0.027) 0.047 (0.019) 1.147 (0.021) 1.185 (0.048) 0.180 (0.229) 0.152 (0.164) 0.000 -12.15 -2.98
Ind 31 192 0.298 (0.043) 0.625 (0.053) 0.077 (0.028) 1.149 (0.036) 1.149 (0.097) 0.002 (0.291) 0.002 (0.289) 1.000 -5.53 -0.83
Ind 38 319 0.356 (0.035) 0.558 (0.058) 0.086 (0.025) 1.102 (0.031) 1.116 (0.075) 0.065 (0.294) 0.061 (0.259) 0.172 -8.07 -1.86
Ind 8 724 0.295 (0.024) 0.682 (0.021) 0.023 (0.014) 1.219 (0.018) 1.429 (0.045) 0.746 (0.121) 0.427 (0.040) 1.000 -10.59 -0.33
Ind 36 1000 0.372 (0.020) 0.563 (0.017) 0.065 (0.013) 1.142 (0.016) 1.272 (0.038) 0.537 (0.132) 0.349 (0.056) 0.000 -16.96 -3.45
Ind 12 179 0.337 (0.033) 0.688 (0.025) -0.025 (0.027) 1.285 (0.032) 1.431 (0.052) 0.508 (0.153) 0.337 (0.067) 1.000 -7.58 -2.44
Ind 24 205 0.264 (0.038) 0.623 (0.030) 0.113 (0.020) 1.174 (0.024) 1.253 (0.061) 0.227 (0.167) 0.185 (0.111) 1.000 -6.16 0.52
Ind 7 213 0.359 (0.039) 0.566 (0.035) 0.075 (0.037) 1.164 (0.045) 1.206 (0.075) 0.183 (0.228) 0.155 (0.163) 0.999 -6.25 0.30
Ind 27 270 0.280 (0.039) 0.674 (0.030) 0.046 (0.023) 1.193 (0.024) 1.312 (0.058) 0.536 (0.214) 0.349 (0.091) 0.692 -7.98 -1.73
Ind 37 599 0.238 (0.040) 0.692 (0.032) 0.070 (0.024) 1.243 (0.029) 1.564 (0.072) 0.719 (0.132) 0.418 (0.045) 0.000 -11.94 -2.24
Ind 34 125 0.267 (0.034) 0.714 (0.045) 0.019 (0.037) 1.249 (0.049) 1255 (0.080) 0.022 (0.174) 0.021 (0.167) 1.000 -6.16 0.52
Ind 35 138 0.335 (0.028) 0.668 (0.021) -0.003 (0.022) 1.244 (0.025) 1.362 (0.044) 0.490 (0.147) 0.329 (0.066) 1.000 -7.18 -0.58
Ind 15 129 0.307 (0.043) 0.674 (0.029) 0.019 (0.033) 1.245 (0.034) 1.265 (0.054) 0.078 (0.201) 0.072 (0.173) 1.000 -5.42 -1.98
Ind 26 391 0.252 (0.032) 0.659 (0.030) 0.088 (0.028) 1.189 (0.038) 1.401 (0.064) 0.482 (0.120) 0.325 (0.055) 0.015 -9.16 -2.00
Ind 30 330 0.295 (0.024) 0.703 (0.028) 0.002 (0.025) 1.295 (0.035) 1.328 (0.053) 0.063 (0.103) 0.060 (0.091) 0.100 -8.52 -3.32
Total 8663 0.291 (0.008) 0.687 (0.008) 0.022 1.208 (0.008) 1.401 (0.017) 1.125 (0.001) 0.529 (0.007) 0.000 -36.83 -4.97
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Table A.3.a (ctd)
Industry analysis: Estimated industry-level output elasticities bεQJj (J = N,M,K), mark-up µˆj (only) and extent of rent sharing φˆj
Part 4: GMM SYS: bφj = 0 ∨ bµj only ≥ 1 [11 industries] - bφj = 1 ∨ bµj only ≥ 1 [1 industry]
GMM SYS (t− 2)(t− 3)
Industry # Firms bεQNj bεQMj bεQKj µˆj only µˆj bγj φˆj Sargan m1 m2
Ind 3 106 0.331 (0.044) 0.640 (0.038) 0.028 (0.052) 1.228 (0.058) 1.107 (0.066) -0.489 (0.198) -0.955 (0.756) 1.000 -4.39 -1.42
Ind 21 154 0.357 (0.047) 0.647 (0.042) -0.003 (0.030) 1.175 (0.035) 1.170 (0.076) -0.029 (0.386) -0.030 (0.409) 1.000 -6.88 -0.28
Ind 17 171 0.331 (0.049) 0.626 (0.036) 0.043 (0.029) 1.081 (0.026) 1.053 (0.060) -0.238 (0.520) -0.312 (0.894) 1.000 -6.24 0.27
Ind 32 171 0.311 (0.033) 0.611 (0.033) 0.078 (0.028) 1.162 (0.037) 1.084 (0.069) -0.281 (0.207) -0.390 (0.399) 1.000 -5.28 -1.67
Ind 4 126 0.217 (0.029) 0.754 (0.046) 0.028 (0.049) 1.186 (0.064) 1.107 (0.067) -0.396 (0.153) -0.655 (0.419) 1.000 -2.07 -2.45
Ind 20 268 0.447 (0.039) 0.606 (0.040) -0.053 (0.027) 1.222 (0.033) 1.133 (0.074) -0.536 (0.375) -1.155 (1.741) 0.983 -8.95 -1.79
Ind 19 182 0.431 (0.062) 0.559 (0.042) 0.010 (0.037) 1.211 (0.039) 1.149 (0.087) -0.263 (0.419) -0.356 (0.770) 1.000 -7.77 -0.34
Ind 10 114 0.341 (0.039) 0.652 (0.037) 0.006 (0.030) 1.266 (0.036) 1.228 (0.069) -0.130 (0.203) -0.149 (0.267) 1.000 -5.30 0.43
Ind 1 324 0.415 (0.046) 0.576 (0.041) 0.009 (0.040) 1.014 (0.054) 0.949 (0.067) -1.228 (0.368) 5.393 (7.108) 0.252 -6.86 -1.21
Ind 9 130 0.329 (0.046) 0.677 (0.027) -0.005 (0.037) 1.309 (0.040) 1.276 (0.051) -0.109 (0.180) -0.122 (0.227) 1.000 -4.37 -1.24
Ind 25 104 0.357 (0.043 0.512 (0.039) 0.131 (0.048) 1.128 (0.062) 1.115 (0.086) -0.037 (0.226) -0.039 (0.244) 1.000 -3.74 -1.36
Ind 14 133 0.364 (0.042) 0.581 (0.037) 0.055 (0.026) 1.157 (0.030) 1.042 (0.066) -0.496 (0.321) -0.983 (1.264) 1.000 -6.57 -0.34
Total 1983 0.161 (0.022) 0.805 (0.019) 0.034 1.214 (0.016) 1.438 (0.035) 1.082 (0.073) 0.520 (0.017) 0.000 -17.52 -2.32
Time dummies are included but not reported. First-step robust standard errors in parentheses.
(1) Input shares: see Part 1-2 of this table.
(2) Instruments used: the lagged levels of n, m and k dated (t−2) and (t−3) in the first-diﬀerenced equations and
the lagged first-diﬀerences of n, m and k dated (t− 1) in the levels equations.
(3) Sargan: test of overidentifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as χ2df . p-values are reported.
(4) m1 andm2 : tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation in the first-diﬀerenced residuals, asymptotically distributed asN(0, 1).
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Table A.3.b
Industry analysis: Correlation of µˆj (only), bγj and φˆj within and across diﬀerent estimators
Full sample bφj ∈ [0, 1]
Correlation
OLS
DIF
GMM DIF
(t− 2)(t− 3)
GMM SYS
(t− 2)(t− 3)
OLS
DIF
GMM DIF
(t− 2)(t− 3)
GMM SYS
(t− 2)(t− 3)
µˆj only − µˆj 0.608 0.588 0.557 0.581 0.689 0.539
µˆj − bγj 0.857 0.789 0.787 0.482 0.438 0.538
µˆj − φˆj 0.820 0.223 -0.065 0.484 0.331 0.604
# bφj = 0 (# sign.)a 14 (3) 18 (0) 11 (0)
# bφj = 1 (# sign.) 0 2 (1) 1 (0)
a Significant at -at least- 10%.
Full sample (38 industries) bφj ∈ [0, 1]
Correlation
GMM DIF
(t− 2)(t− 3)
GMM SYS
(t− 2)(t− 3)
GMM DIF
(t− 2)(t− 3)
GMM SYS
(t− 2)(t− 3)
OLS DIF
µˆj only : 0.266
µˆj : 0.453bγj : 0.157
φˆj : 0.034
µˆj only : 0.313
µˆj : 0.615bγj : 0.714
φˆj : 0.187
µˆj only : 0.149
µˆj : 0.182bγj : 0.370
φˆj : 0.324
14 industries
µˆj only : 0.453
µˆj : 0.165bγj : 0.639
φˆj : 0.619
21 industries
GMM DIF
(t− 2)(t− 3)
µˆj only : -0.083
µˆj : 0.285bγj : 0.153
φˆj : 0.003
µˆj only : -0.113
µˆj : -0.253bγj : 0.477
φˆj : 0.375
15 industries
(1) GMM DIF : the set of instruments includes the lagged levels of n, m and k dated (t− 2) and (t− 3).
(2) GMM SY S: the set of instruments includes the lagged levels of n, m and k dated (t− 2) and (t− 3) in
the first-diﬀerenced equations and correspondingly the lagged first-diﬀerences of n, m and k dated (t− 1) in
the levels equations.
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Table A.4
Heterogeneity of firm output elasticities bεQJi (J = N,M,K), mark-up µˆi (only) and extent of rent sharing φˆi :
Diﬀerent indicators and first-diﬀerenced OLS estimates
Part 1: bµi ≥ 1 ∨ bφi ∈ [0, 1] [5906 firms] - bφi = 0 ∨ bµi only ≥ 1 [1239 firms]
αNi αMi αKi bεQNi bεQMi bεQKi µˆi only µˆi bγi φˆibµi ≥ 1 ∨ bφi ∈ [0, 1] [5906 firms]
SIMPLE
Observed variance bσ2o 0.017 0.019 0.008 0.050 0.039 0.042 0.076 0.284 3.093 0.046
Sampling variance bσ2s 0.0002 0.0006 0.001 0.046 0.026 0.035 0.046 0.185 1.825 0.172
True variance bσ2truea 0.017 0.018 0.007 0.004 0.013 0.007 0.030 0.099 1.268 0
F-testb 85 31.667 8 1.087 1.500 1.200 1.652 1.535 1.695 0.267
WEIGHTED
Observed variance bσ2o 0.019 0.020 0.019 0.028 0.034 0.020 0.029 0.087 1.380 0.013
Sampling variance bσ2s 0.00004 0.00003 0.0004 0.013 0.009 0.008 0.011 0.031 0.161 0.001
True variance bσ2truea 0.019 0.020 0.019 0.015 0.025 0.012 0.018 0.056 1.219 0.012
F-testb 475 667 47.5 2.154 3.778 2.500 2.636 2.806 8.571 13
MEDIAN
Interquartile observed variance bσ2o 0.019 0.025 0.011 0.037 0.038 0.030 0.045 0.150 1.935 0.056
Robust sampling variance bσ2s 0.0002 0.0008 0.0012 0.025 0.016 0.018 0.025 0.072 0.594 0.015
Robust true variance bσ2truea 0.019 0.024 0.010 0.012 0.022 0.012 0.020 0.078 1.341 0.041
F-testb 95 31.25 9.167 1.480 2.375 1.667 1.800 2.083 3.257 3.733bφi = 0 ∨ bµi only ≥ 1 [1239 firms]
SIMPLE
Observed variance bσ2o 0.010 0.018 0.014 0.025 0.027 0.028 0.077 0.057 0.082 686
Sampling variance bσ2s 0.0002 0.0007 0.001 0.050 0.027 0.036 0.049 0.153 2.660 2.40 108
True variance bσ2truea 0.010 0.017 0.013 0 0 0 0.028 0 0 0
F-testb 50 25.714 14 0.500 1 0.778 1.571 0.372 0.031 2.858 10−6
WEIGHTED
Observed variance bσ2o 0.012 0.020 0.025 0.022 0.026 0.013 0.029 0.024 0.066 0.037
Sampling variance bσ2s 0.00004 0.00003 0.0002 0.017 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.031 0.362 0.830
True variance bσ2truea 0.012 0.020 0.025 0.005 0.017 0.004 0.020 0 0 0
F-testb 300 667 125 1.294 2.889 1.444 3.222 0.774 0.182 0.044
MEDIAN
Interquartile observed variance bσ2o 0.012 0.029 0.023 0.023 0.028 0.018 0.050 0.037 0.134 1.795
Robust sampling variance bσ2s 0.0002 0.0008 0.001 0.030 0.017 0.019 0.022 0.070 1.028 10.305
Robust true variance bσ2truea 0.012 0.028 0.022 0 0.011 0 0.028 0 0 0
F-testb 60 36.25 23 0.767 1.647 0.947 2.273 0.528 0.130 0.174
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Table A.4 (ctd)
Heterogeneity of firm output elasticities bεQJi (J = N,M,K), mark-up µˆi (only) and extent of rent sharing φˆi :
Diﬀerent indicators and first-diﬀerenced OLS estimates
Part 2: Full sample [10646 firms]
αNi αMi αKi bεQNi bεQMi bεQKi µˆi only µˆi bγi φˆi
Full sample [10646 firms]
SIMPLE
Observed variance bσ2o 0.016 0.019 0.010 0.093 0.066 0.058 0.096 0.372 3146 327
Sampling variance bσ2s 0.0002 0.0006 0.0009 0.055 0.028 0.041 0.051 0.176 8.45 108 1.55 109
True variance bσ2truea 0.016 0.018 0.009 0.038 0.038 0.017 0.045 0.196 0 0
F-testb 80 31.667 11.111 1.690 2.357 1.415 1.822 2.114 3.72 10−6 2.11 10−7
WEIGHTED
Observed variance bσ2o 0.019 0.020 0.022 0.054 0.055 0.026 0.038 0.139 1.619 0.015
Sampling variance bσ2s 0.00004 0.00003 0.0003 0.015 0.010 0.010 0.012 0.032 0.257 0.002
True variance bσ2truea 0.019 0.020 0.022 0.039 0.045 0.016 0.026 0.107 1.362 0.013
F-testb 475 667 73.33 3.600 5.500 2.600 3.167 4.343 6.300 7.500
MEDIAN
Interquartile observed variance bσ2o 0.018 0.026 0.013 0.077 0.068 0.039 0.060 0.209 3.803 0.189
Robust sampling variance bσ2s 0.0002 0.0006 0.0011 0.030 0.017 0.020 0.026 0.074 1.312 0.068
Robust true variance bσ2truea 0.018 0.025 0.012 0.047 0.051 0.019 0.034 0.135 2.491 0.121
F-testb 90 43.333 11.818 2.567 4 1.950 2.308 2.824 2.899 2.779
a The estimated true variance is computed by adjusting the observed variance for the sampling variability: bσ2true = bσ2o− bσ2s.
b F-test=
?σ2o
?σ2s
.
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Table A.5
Within-industry dispersion: Weighted mean and Swamy estimate of weighted true standard deviation (bσtrue) of bεQJij ,
mark-up µˆij(only) and extent of rent sharing φˆij
OLS DIF
Industry bεQNij bεQMij bεQKij µˆij only µˆij bγij φˆij
Ind 6 0.276 [0.010] 0.490 [0.012] 0.082 [0.009] 1.109 [0.009] 1.207 [0.015] 1.782 [0.082] 0.857 [0.004]
Ind 18 0.318 [0.010] 0.607 [0.007] 0.078 [0.009] 1.107 [0.007] 1.184 [0.011] 1.275 [0.098] 0.881 [0.004]
Ind 17 0.212 [0.011] 0.719 [0.011] 0.050 [0.009] 1.077 [0.009] 1.170 [0.015] 1.311 [0.102] 0.855 [0.008]
Ind 20 0.274 [0.013] 0.632 [0.011] 0.062 [0.010] 1.099 [0.007] 1.134 [0.015] 1.051 [0.065] 0.867 [0.008]
Ind 16 0.260 [0.024] 0.577 [0.018] 0.067 [0.016] 1.080 [0.016] 1.163 [0.030] 1.008 [0.120] 0.774 [0.009]
Ind 22 0.263 [0.013] 0.569 [0.011] 0.083 [0.012] 1.062 [0.010] 1.159 [0.021] 2.006 [0.105] 0.859 [0.005]
Ind 28 0.199 [0.011] 0.609 [0.011] 0.131 [0.010] 1.078 [0.010] 1.196 [0.017] 1.242 [0.064] 0.834 [0.007]
Ind 5 0.118 [0.007] 0.721 [0.010] 0.070 [0.006] 1.083 [0.008] 1.271 [0.020] 1.567 [0.056] 0.794 [0.004]
Ind 13 0.218 [0.014] 0.566 [0.018] 0.125 [0.017] 1.026 [0.020] 1.167 [0.037] 1.013 [0.116] 0.852 [0.007]
Ind 23 0.351 [0.019] 0.501 [0.019] 0.068 [0.013] 1.055 [0.015] 1.080 [0.036] 1.338 [0.155] 0.922 [0.004]
Ind 11 0.192 [0.008] 0.685 [0.010] 0.070 [0.008] 1.107 [0.009] 1.249 [0.016] 1.235 [0.055] 0.757 [0.006]
Ind 33 0.207 [0.007] 0.660 [0.007] 0.077 [0.007] 1.097 [0.006] 1.144 [0.012] 1.025 [0.043] 0.781 [0.005]
Ind 38 0.227 [0.007] 0.650 [0.007] 0.052 [0.008] 1.114 [0.005] 1.248 [0.011] 1.250 [0.038] 0.733 [0.004]
Ind 36 0.249 [0.006] 0.583 [0.006] 0.105 [0.006] 1.111 [0.005] 1.268 [0.011] 1.452 [0.033] 0.771 [0.003]
Ind 12 0.269 [0.016] 0.621 [0.014] 0.051 [0.010] 1.158 [0.010] 1.228 [0.019] 1.185 [0.079] 0.778 [0.009]
Ind 24 0.225 [0.010] 0.634 [0.011] 0.123 [0.010] 1.143 [0.011] 1.210 [0.018] 0.521 [0.043] 0.640 [0.010]
Ind 7 0.208 [0.012] 0.668 [0.014] 0.038 [0.012] 1.148 [0.015] 1.335 [0.021] 0.812 [0.074] 0.814 [0.018]
Ind 27 0.223 [0.012] 0.627 [0.012] 0.051 [0.010] 1.111 [0.008] 1.152 [0.018] 1.045 [0.063] 0.820 [0.007]
Ind 37 0.195 [0.008] 0.593 [0.009] 0.106 [0.008] 1.117 [0.008] 1.233 [0.015] 1.076 [0.032] 0.694 [0.004]
Ind 14 0.253 [0.014] 0.763 [0.012] 0.027 [0.011] 1.173 [0.012] 1.222 [0.017] 0.508 [0.070] 0.761 [0.012]
Ind 35 0.204 [0.014] 0.636 [0.012] 0.081 [0.016] 1.109 [0.016] 1.193 [0.029] 1.272 [0.083] 0.751 [0.009]
Ind 15 0.215 [0.015] 0.694 [0.017] 0.069 [0.011] 1.160 [0.012] 1.184 [0.019] 0.724 [0.075] 0.708 [0.010]
Ind 26 0.253 [0.010] 0.630 [0.011] 0.080 [0.008] 1.117 [0.009] 1.222 [0.016] 0.752 [0.041] 0.764 [0.008]
Ind 30 0.289 [0.016] 0.562 [0.015] 0.091 [0.011] 1.101 [0.012] 1.033 [0.030] 0.950 [0.046] 0.757 [0.008]
Ind 3 0.165 [0.019] 0.633 [0.027] 0.051 [0.022] 1.101 [0.027] 1.016 [0.038] 0.334 [0.051] 0.877 [0.023]
Ind 21 0.249 [0.013] 0.630 [0.015] 0.058 [0.013] 1.073 [0.011] 1.100 [0.028] 0.769 [0.048] 0.837 [0.015]
Ind 2 0.084 [0.012] 0.796 [0.018] 0.045 [0.011] 1.102 [0.011] 1.096 [0.021] 0.686 [0.049] 0.655 [0.016]
Ind 32 0.197 [0.018] 0.631 [0.017] 0.085 [0.016] 1.109 [0.018] 1.085 [0.026] 0.736 [0.080] 0.761 [0.009]
Ind 4 0.132 [0.013] 0.800 [0.020] 0.047 [0.009] 1.106 [0.012] 1.097 [0.020] 0.216 [0.044] 0.662 [0.023]
Ind 19 0.328 [0.016] 0.522 [0.015] 0.090 [0.011] 1.107 [0.012] 1.066 [0.023] 0.638 [0.079] 0.851 [0.009]
Ind 10 0.273 [0.019] 0.535 [0.023] 0.074 [0.015] 1.102 [0.017] 1.034 [0.032] 0.534 [0.077] 0.703 [0.015]
Ind 1 0.156 [0.009] 0.680 [0.014] 0.060 [0.007] 1.080 [0.006] 1.055 [0.015] 0.650 [0.044] 0.817 [0.009]
Ind 29 0.180 [0.009] 0.680 [0.011] 0.054 [0.009] 1.153 [0.008] 1.243 [0.016] 1.002 [0.033] 0.718 [0.005]
Ind 31 0.295 [0.015] 0.574 [0.017] 0.062 [0.013] 1.088 [0.014] 1.018 [0.026] 0.866 [0.075] 0.813 [0.011]
Ind 38 0.289 [0.012] 0.559 [0.012] 0.074 [0.010] 1.091 [0.008] 1.085 [0.020] 1.142 [0.066] 0.820 [0.006]
Ind 9 0.330 [0.022] 0.593 [0.020] 0.039 [0.015] 1.162 [0.014] 1.087 [0.029] 0.496 [0.066] 0.774 [0.016]
Ind 25 0.277 [0.009] 0.592 [0.024] 0.039 [0.012] 1.130 [0.011] 1.120 [0.023] 0.814 [0.112] 0.797 [0.010]
Ind 34 0.219 [0.019] 0.669 [0.018] 0.094 [0.021] 1.086 [0.013] 1.084 [0.021] 0.669 [0.100] 0.779 [0.009]
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Appendix B: Extension embedding the monopsony model
B.1 Model
The R. Hall (1988) model is based on the assumption that there is a potentially infinite supply of
employees wanting a job in the firm. Limited mobility on the part of the employees and entry costs
on the part of competing firms might however create rents to jobs. This gives employers some power
over their workers as a small wage cut will no longer induce them to leave the firm.
Consider a firm facing a labor supply Nit (wit), which is an increasing function of the wage wit. The
monopsonist firm objective is to maximize its short-run profit function, taking the labor supply curve
as a given:
max
wit,Mit
π(wit, Nit, Mit) = Rit(Nit (wit) , Mit)− witNit (wit)− jitMit (B.1)
Maximization with respect to material input gives RM,it = jit, which directly leads to the correspond-
ing equation (3). Maximization with respect to the wage rate gives the following first-order condition:
wit =
µ
εNwit
1 + εNwit
¶
RN,it (B.2)
where εNwit ∈ <+ represents the elasticity of the labor supply. From (B.2), it follows that the degree
of monopsony power, measured by
³
RN,it
wit
´
, depends negatively on εNwit . Rewriting (B.2) results in a
modified equation (2):
εQNit = µitαNit
µ
1 +
1
εNwit
¶
(B.3)
Assuming constant returns to scale, estimation of the reduced-form equation qit − kit = εQNit(nit −
kit)+ ε
Q
Mit(mit− kit)+ θit, allows the identification of (1) the mark-up of price over marginal cost and
(2) the elasticity of the supply of labor of the firm with respect to the wage rate:
µit =
εQMit
αMit
(B.4)
βit =
εNwit
1 + εNwit
=
αNit
αMit
εQMit
εQNit
(B.5)
εNwit =
βit
1− βit
(B.6)
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B.2 Results
We first present the estimates of the labor supply elasticity at the manufacturing, the industry and
the firm level and then comment on the results at the diﬀerent levels.
Manufacturing-level results
Table B.1
Estimates of output elasticities bεQJ (J = N,M,K), mark-up µˆ and labor supply elasticity bεNw :
Full sample: 10646 firms - Period 1978-2001
OLS
LEVELS
OLS
DIF
GMM DIF
(t− 2)(t− 3)
GMM SYS
(t− 2)(t− 3)bεQN 0.331(0.003) 0.298(0.003) 0.138(0.020) 0.298(0.008)bεQM 0.592(0.003) 0.587(0.003) 0.726(0.017) 0.675(0.007)bεQK 0.077 0.115 0.137 0.027bµ 1.177
(0.007)
1.167
(0.005)
1.443
(0.033)
1.342
(0.015)bεNw -12.343(2.106) -6.246(0.425) -1.453(0.109) -3.623(0.327)
Robust standard errors and first-step robust standard errors in columns 3-4.
Time dummies are included but not reported.
(1) bεQK = 1− bεQN − bεQM .
(2) Input shares: αN = 0.307, αM = 0.503, αK = 0.190.
Across-industry estimates
Table B.2
Estimated industry-level output elasticities bεQJj (J = N,M,K), mark-up µˆj and labor supply elasticity bεNwj a
OLS DIF
38 industries bεQNj bεQMj bεQKj bµj bεNwj
Industry mean 0.308 (0.016) 0.580 (0.014) 0.111 (0.013) 1.125 (0.027) -1.665 (66.79)
Industry Q1 0.275 (0.012) 0.541 (0.010) 0.091 (0.010) 1.041 (0.021) -6.782 (0.399)
Industry median 0.302 (0.016) 0.573 (0.013) 0.106 (0.013) 1.150 (0.025) -2.972 (1.324)
Industry Q3 0.340 (0.020) 0.638 (0.017) 0.123 (0.016) 1.188 (0.033) 1.894 (7.007)
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
a Detailed information on the industry-level estimates is available upon request.
Within-industry firm estimates
Table B.3
Estimated firm-level output elasticities bεQJi (J = N,M,K), mark-up µˆi and labor supply elasticity bεNwi a
OLS DIF
10646 firms bεQNi bεQMi bεQKi bµi bεNwi
Firm mean 0.288 (0.201) 0.599 (0.149) 0.112 (0.171) 1.239 (0.334) -6.132 (30 104)
Firm Q1 0.094 (0.119) 0.434 (0.094) -0.025 (0.097) 0.908 (0.179) -1.685 (0.309)
Firm median 0.263 (0.174) 0.614 (0.132) 0.094 (0.145) 1.200 (0.273) -0.928 (0.913)
Firm Q3 0.459 (0.249) 0.778 (0.185) 0.236 (0.211) 1.508 (0.410) 0.520 (4.096)
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
a Detailed information on the firm-level estimates is available upon request.
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Discussion results
Contrary to the theoretical prediction, the labor supply elasticity is estimated to be significantly
negative across the diﬀerent estimators at the manufacturing level (see Table B.1). Focusing on the
first-diﬀerenced OLS estimator, the labor supply elasticity estimate amounts to -6.25.
From Table B.2, it follows that the elasticity of the labor supply with respect to the wage rate is
estimated to be lower than -6.78 for the first quartile of industries and higher than 1.89 for the top
quartile. More specifically, the labor supply elasticity estimate is positive for 14 out of 38 industries,
with 10 out of 14 estimates being significantly positive.1 For those industries, bεNwj lies in the [0.88, 7.53]-
interval.
Table B.3 shows that εNwi is estimated to be lower than -1.68 for the first quartile of firms and higher
than 0.52 for the top quartile. For 4024 out of 10646 firms, the labor supply elasticity estimate is
positive. However, only 355 of these estimates are significantly positive.2 For these firms, bεNwi lies in
the [0.04, 2.78]-interval.
Based on these findings, we conclude that the extension embedding the monopsony model is rejected
by the data.
1Note that ?µj ≥ 1 ∨ ?εNwj > 0 for 9 industries. 5 of these industries have a significantly positive labor supply
elasticity estimate.
2Note that ?µi ≥ 1 ∨ ?εNwi > 0 for only 1340 firms. 91 of these firms have a significantly positive labor supply
elasticity estimate.
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Appendix C: Accounting measures of product and labor market imperfections at
the industry and the firm level
To compare our estimated price-cost mark-up and extent of rent sharing parameters, µˆ only, µˆ, and φˆ ,
with accounting measures, we follow Veugelers (1989) and compute the following three variables, µ onlya, µa
and φa, as follows:
µ onlya =
PQ − jM − wN
PQ
(C.1)
µa =
PQ − jM − wN
PQ
= µ onlya +
(w − w)N
PQ
(C.2)
φa =
(w − w)N
PQ − jM − wN = 1−
µ onlya
µa
(C.3)
where the alternative wage w is measured by the 5th percentile value of the nominal wage per worker in the
industry in which the firm operates.
Tables C.1 and C.2 present summary information on the accounting price-cost mark-ups (µ onlya and µa)
and the extent of rent sharing (φa) at the industry and the firm level and show the correlation between the
accounting measures of product and labor market imperfections and the estimated (first-diﬀerenced OLS)
parameters at both levels. Consistent with section 4.1 and section 5.2 , we consider two subsamples. The
first subsample consists of industry (firm) estimates for which the price-cost mark-up equals or exceeds 1
and the corresponding extent of rent sharing lies in the [0, 1]-interval. The second subsample includes the
industry (firm) estimates showing no evidence of rent sharing and a price-cost mark-up ignoring labor market
imperfections that equals or exceeds 1.
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Table C.1
Accounting versus estimated price-cost mark-ups and extent of rent sharing at the industry level
Correlation withc
Ind. mean Ind. Q1 Ind. median Ind.Q3 µˆ onlyj − 1 µˆj − 1 φˆj
24 industriesa
µ onlyaj 0.178 0.163 0.175 0.197 0.689
µaj 0.260 0.239 0.264 0.277 0.251
φaj 0.315 0.221 0.342 0.443 0.231
14 industriesb
µ onlyaj 0.197 0.185 0.199 0.213 0.354
a bµj ≥ 1 ∨ bφj ∈ [0, 1].
b bφj = 0 ∨ bµj only ≥ 1.
c For detailed information on the industry-level estimates, see Table A.3.a [Part 1-2] in Appendix A.
Table C.2
Accounting versus estimated price-cost mark-ups and extent of rent sharing at the firm level
Correlation withc
Firm mean Firm Q1 Firm median Firm Q3 µˆ onlyi − 1 µˆi − 1 φˆi
5906 firmsa
µ onlyai 0.177 0.104 0.148 0.210 0.381
µai 0.252 0.182 0.239 0.310 0.324
φai 0.321 0.219 0.359 0.521 0.011
1239 firmsb
µ onlyai 0.234 0.144 0.208 0.293 0.580
a bµi ≥ 1 ∨ bφi ∈ [0, 1].
b bφi = 0 ∨ bµi only ≥ 1.
c For detailed information on the firm-level estimates, see Table A.4 [Part 1] in Appendix A.
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